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The Freight Rate System in the Philippines was established in 
1928 by the then Public Service Commission (PSC). With the 
PSC's a b o li t io n , the ra te  s truc tu re  was continued, with s l ig h t  
modifications, by the Board of Transportation (BOT). With the 
BOT's abolition  in 1985, i t s  ra te -se t t in g  functions pertaining 
to maritime transporta tion  were transferred  to the Maritime 
Industry Authority (MARINA).
Way back in 1967, there were moves to re -s tru c tu re  the f re igh t 
ra te  s truc tu re  to make i t  more responsive to the changing 
economic conditions and to enhance the development of the 
in te r- is land  trade.
Upon i t s  establishment in 1974, the MARINA took the lead role 
in pursuing the re-s truc tu ring  e f fo r t .  A Jo in t  Committee, 
composed of representatives from other government a.gencies, 
from the shipowners/operators group and from the shippers' 
sec to r , was formed.
To re c t ify  the d is to rtions  in the ra te  s truc tu re  brought about 
by across-the-board increases since 1928, the Inter-Agency 
Freight Rate Study Committee recommended three a lte rna tiv es  
which proposed the reduction in the number of commodity classes 
from 15 to e i th e r  6, 8 or 10 Classes. Due to lack of funding 
support, coupled with divergent views on merchandise c l a s s i f i ­
ca tion , number of c la sses ,  etc., the pro jec t was discontinued.
The process of evaluating p e tit ions  fo r  ra te  increase had been 
a straight-forward approach by computing the percentage d i f f e r ­
ence between the actual revenue of the shipping companies and 
the revenue required to enable them to rea lize  a 12 percent 
return on investment, f loa ting  asse ts  plus two-month working 
c a p i ta l ,  net of in te re s t  expense but before income tax.
In 1977, th is  process was s l igh t ly  improved by taking into 
account the income-reducing e ffec t  of the c a r r i e r ' s  tax on 
the incremental revenue aris ing from the ra te  adjustment.
The return on investment of 12 percent had been considered by 
the PSC and the BOT as the "reasonable ra te  of return".  The 
ra te  had been applied by the two agencies for  over 50 years 
despite the increase in the cost of capita l from 12 percent in 
the ear ly 30's to anywhere from 20 to 35 percent a t  present.
In 1984, i t  rose to as high as 60 percent.
The ra te  gap had increased considerably so tha t  the adoption of 
the current reasonable ra te  of return would re su l t  to dras t ic  
changes in t a r i f f  leve ls .
The present process of adjusting rates did not consider the 
changes in ra te s ,  t r a f f i c ,  avai lable tonnage, e tc .  Thus i t  
was possible tha t  rates  were set  r e la t ive ly  low because the 
load factor  of the f l e e t  in the previous year was high. I f  the 
high load fac tor  was due to overloading during peak months, the 
adjusted rates would in e f fec t  encourage the continuance of the 
practice of excessive loading. On the other hand, i f  revenue 
d e f ic i t s  appeared large due to the low u t i l i z a t io n  of vessels ,  -
the resul t ing ra te  adjustment would be tantamount to the ship 
users paying the cost of over-tonnaging.
The ra te  base used in determining the allowable return consisted 
essen t ia l ly  of the book value of the float ing assets  and two- 
month working cap i ta l .  To enable them to obtain a ra te  increase, 
appraisers were hired.  These appraisers generally reported high 
valuations of assets  which, in turn ,  resulted to excessive rate  
increases.
If  the use of the present method would be continued, the MARINA 
should seriously consider the accredita t ion of appraisal com­
panies. Because of the Phil ippines'  low foreign exchange
reserves,  the Central Bank had re s t r i c te d  the importation of 
ships. With the growing trend towards vessel chartering for 
in te r - is land  operations, there would be a decline in inves t­
ments in the f l e e t  capacity. Since the ra te  base for  the 
charterers  would consist  only of working capita l  or capi ta l ized 
leased a sse ts ,  the marginal return might discourage the 
chartering of ships. I f  the re s t r i c t io n  on vessel importation 
continued, then the Philippine in te r - is land  ship operators 
Would have to depend on charter ing, and i f  the exis ting ra te  of 
return would s t i l l  be used, then the ra te  base had to be 
analyzed closely and modified so as not to discourage leasing 
of vessels.
However, other methods or formulas could be used and these would 
not be as problematic as the existing one.
The method and the formula used by the United States Federal 
Maritime Commission were examined. While they would be an im­
provement over the exis ting ones, the data such as long-term 
debt, net income, and stockholders'  equity which would be pub­
lished in the Bureau of the Census Quarterly Financial Reports 
and in te res t  expense on long-term debt which could be obtained 
from Moody's Industr ial  Manual, or similar  f igures ,  would 
unfortunately not be readily  available in the Phil ippines. 
Furthermore, the proper selection of the corporate bond yields 
would be subjective and would require expert judgment.
The formula for  determining f re igh t  for  in te r - is land  shipping, 
used in Indonesia, was likewise considered. A closer  examination 
of th is  formula indicated th a t  i t  took into account the load 
fac tor  and the ports '  eff ic iency fac tors ;  however, calculating 
some of the components of th is  formula would require much work 
and the other components would e i the r  be subjective or time- 
consuming to determine. Another formula tha t  was looked into 
was the "Rate Fixation Formulas of Short-Distance and Long- 
Distance Liner Shipping Conferences". Examination of th is
vi
formula would reveal th a t  to determine the values of the 
e l a s t i c i t i e s  and the ra te  fixation  equations would require 
some knowledge of s t a t i s t i c s .
Commodity stowage, the number of cubic measurement per ton of 
the commodity, had been considered as a cost determinant of 
l in e r  ra tes in th a t  i t  was positively re la ted  to cargo loading 
and unloading costs and was also a determinant of the amount of 
cargo which must share the common costs of ship operations. 
Commodity density , the reciprocal of the commodity stowage, 
determined the extent in which the weight and cubic hauling 
capacity of a ship might be u t i l iz e d ,
F i r s t  and foremost, shipowners and operators must be considered 
as se lling  space and, therefo re , stowage fac to r  must be one of 
the main factors when establishing a f re ig h t  ra te .
In th e i r  empirical s tud ies , a number of authors concluded th a t  
commodity stowage was a determinant of l in e r  conference, ra te s .
In the determination of the stowage fac to r  based fre ig h t  ra te  
(SFBFR), two conditions had to be s a t is f ie d ,  namely:
(a) "The ra t io  of the cubic capacity to the dead­
weight capacity of a vessel should be inversely 
re la ted  to the ra t io  of the f re ig h t ra te  per ton 
weight to the f re ig h t ra te  per ton measurement, and
(b) The to ta l  voyage cost must be covered by the 
revenue obtainable on a break-even point of cargo­
carrying capacity".
Even in the case of a llocating  cost to heterogeneous cargoes, 
the SFBFR method appeared to be the most equitable in the appor­
tionment of costs and a t  the same time came out with a moderate 
level of f re ig h t  ra tes  based on costs .
In most developed maritime countries , l in e r  ra tes  were value- 
based and were se t  by l in e r  conferences. To prevent overpricing.
a suitable  platform for  the negotiation of f re igh t  rates  was 
provided where both the ship operators and the shippers 
j u s t i f i e d  th e i r  posi t ion. The free entry of non-conference 
l ine rs  and tramps had also served to minimize, i f  not avoid, 
overpricing.
Conferences fixed rates  a t  levels  designed to a t t r a c t  t r a f f i c ,  
a t  rates  tha t  would cause cargo to move and, to be able to 
accomplish these objectives, conferences divided commodities 
in several categories taking into account "what the t r a f f i c  
could bear".
Consultants from SHIPDECO of Norway, together with MARINA s t a f f  
members, const i tu te  the Shipdeco-Marina Team on Standard Ship 
Design. These consultants were openly in favour of free com­
p e t i t io n ,  but "a system based on load fac tor  and eff iciency is 
considerably be t te r  than today's system with an excessive 
number of licenses being issued".
In Norway, shipping operators were exposed to free competition. 
The f re ight  rates were governed by supply and demand. This 
system had been considered one of the most important aspects in 
the development of the Norwegian shipping industry.
On deregulation, in terms of benefi ts  derived, there was no 
be t te r  proof of successful implementation than the a i r l in e  de­
regulation in the United States. Regulatory ba rr ie rs  to entry 
were removed; exis ting ca r r ie r s  could enter routes of th e i r  
choice. The management of a i r l in e s  was given complete freedom 
in the re-s tructuring of th e i r  route networks. Complete 
freedom of pricing now existed.
Consumers gained more than $3 b i l l io n  in benefi ts  and ca r r ie rs  
enjoyed the f l e x i b i l i t y  tha t  they needed to b e t te r  th e i r  
financial outlook.
Since 1983, the Philippine Government had already deregulated 
the f i r s t  c lass passenger rates  and up to th is  time no complaint
had been received e i the r  from the passengers or from the 
shipping companies.
"While regulation would not be en t i re ly  undesirable, the need 
for  administrative p rac t icab i l i ty  and the d i f f ic u l ty  of 
economic prediction,  par t icu la r ly  on demand responses, would 
make i t  v i r tu a l ly  impossible for  the regulator to rep l ica te  
the price and cost resu l ts  of a hypothetically competitive 
industry. The regulatory process, even assuming i t  would 
function perfect ly ,  would not be able to reproduce the price 
signals tha t  a workably competitive market place would provide".
In recent years,  two important forms of l in e r  surcharges had 
been applied, namely: the Bunker Adjustment Factor (BAF) and
the Currency Adjustment Factor (CAF). BAFs and CAFs were 
intended to compensate shipping l ines for  changes in costs which 
arose from changes in bunker prices and changes in currency 
exchange ra te s ,  respectively.
Conferences used two establ ished formulas, but the more widely 
used formula (Formula I) calculated a percentage change in 
bunker prices weighted by a bunker incidence fac to r .  This 
weighted percentage change was the BAF applied to the base 
f re igh t  ra te .
The calculat ion of the general ra te  increase (GRI) involved the 
estimation of weighted percentage changes in the various cost 
items contained in the l in e s '  voyage cost ings.  These percentage 
changes were then added up to obtain an over-all percentage cost  
increase which was the required GRI.
For the calculat ion of the general ra te  increase and the bunker 
and currency surcharges, the method widely used by the conferences, 
the weighted percentage cost change, would be the simplest and 
the most logical replacement of the existing method.
Among the methods or formulas presented, two appeared to be the
,best  replacement of the existing method. In the order of 
immediate implementability, these would be the ^ ^ R ^ e t h o d  
and deregulation.
While deregulation would have more advantages than the SFBFR 
method, the absence of the major elements necessary for  the 
proper functioning of the mechanism of consultation and 
negotiation between the shippers group and the conference of 
shipowners and operators would d ic ta te  tha t  i t s  implementation 
be deferred to a l a t e r  date. Associations of large manufacturers 
had emerged, but the presence of organizations to represent 
numerous commodity groups would s t i l l  be sadly lacking.
In the in te res t  of the public, the undue increase in f re ight  
rates  of essentia l  commodities should be avoided and, there ­
fore ,  i t  would be necessary tha t  deregulation should proceed 
gradually.
With the exception of "free competition", the SFBFR method 
seemed to be the most advantageous of a l l  the other methods 
and formulas mentioned in th is  study. I f  f in a l ly  adopted, i t s  
application would, however, be s l ig h t ly  delayed to provide 






The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,  j u s t  l ike  a 
few in the world, regulates public services or u t i l i t i e s  as a 
means of protecting the in te re s t  of the public. Among the many 
aspects of public service in the Philippines is sea t ransport ­
ation primarily because of the archipelagic nature of i t s  
geography. The Philippine sea transport  industry serves not 
only the needs of the movement of population but a lso ,  more 
importantly, the movement of commodities from areas of production 
to areas of consumption. I t  i s ,  therefore ,  a v i ta l  segment of 
the national economy.
Insofar as the f re igh t  rate  system is concerned, however, there 
seems to be no prevailing rate  structure  and ra te  adjustment 
formula e ffect ive  a t  the moment, which can claim to best su i t  the 
conditions obtaining in the country.
I t  i s ,  therefore ,  the object of th is  study to d issec t  the 
existing ra te  s tructure  and formula, analyze deficiencies in th is  
area,  make the logical conclusions based on fac ts /data  avai lable, 
and offer  recommendations which may improve the present rate  
st ructure and formula.
Parts of the Study
This study will be loosely divided into three pa r t s ,  with topical 
concentration, as follows:
PART I - (Chapters I to IV, inclusive) will d issect  the 
prevailing f re igh t  ra te  formula and rate  
adjustment formula, trace the development of
2
the subject matter from 1928, make a 
c r i t i c a l  evaluation of the same, putting 
emphasis on deficiencies in the process.
PART II - (Chapters V to X, inclusive) will present
new methods, c i t e  advantages and l im i ta t ions ,  
accenting app l icab i l i ty  in the Philippines 
considering national conditions.
PART III  - (Chapter XI) will f in a l ly  make the logical 
conclusions and recommend a l te rna t ive  
courses of action,  p r io r i t ized  in accordance 
with th e i r  immediate implementability.
Significance of the Study
Based on the archipelagic make-up of the Phil ippines,  a study of 
th is  nature is long overdue. In the bench-mark research con­
ducted, i t  would seem that  there is  no authori ta t ive  l i t e ra tu re  
on the subject a t  th is  point in time. Many studies on many 
aspects of sea transport  were s tar ted  in 1977 under the auspices 
of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), but they remain to 
be completed to th is  time.
This study may, therefore,  be considered pioneering in character 
in the subject .  I t  is hoped tha t  th is  study will serve to 
generate in te res t  in the subject matter and s t a r t  a chain- 
reaction follow-up on the part  of students ,  regula tors ,  and 
pract i t ioners  in the maritime industry.
Objectives of the Study
This study aims to present the exis ting f re igh t  ra te  structure  
and ra te  adjustment formula, tracing i t s  development since 
1928, making a c r i t i c a l  evaluation of advantages and d i s ­
advantages, presenting a l te rna t ive  methods which can best su i t  
the conditions prevailing in the country, making the logical 
conclusions, and presenting workable recommendations p r io r i t ized
according to immediate implementability.
3
Limitations of the Study
This study l imits  i t s e l f  in scope to the f re igh t  rates of 
domestic l in e r  vessels in the Phil ippines, t h e i r  f re igh t  rate  
s t ruc ture ,  th e i r  ra te  adjustment formula, and the method used. 
Since l i t e r a tu r e  on the subject matter is  sadly lacking in the 
national scene, attempts have been made to f i t  app l icab i l i ty  of 
exis ting l i t e r a tu r e  on the subject matter in the international 
s e t t in g ,  as much as possible , into national conditions.
Starting Point of the Study
The prevailing ra te  s tructure  and formula were se t  by the defunct 
Public Service Commission (PSC) way back in 1928‘and were con­
tinued, with s l ig h t  modifications, by the Board of Transportation 
(BOT). With the BOT's recent aboli t ion and the t rans fe r  of i t s  
ra te - se t t ing  functions pertaining to maritime transportation to 
the MARINA, i t  is  now incumbent on the MARINA to correct  or 
change the present ra te  s tructure  and formula to become more 
e f f i c i e n t ,  e f fec t ive ,  u t i l e .
■Changes to the exis ting ra te  s tructure  and formula, i f  any, will 
have to be introduced gradually so as not to r e su l t  in the undue 
hike of prices of essential commodities, minimizing a t  the same 
time abrupt increases or decreases in f re igh t  ra te s .
CHAPTER I I
THE PUBLIC SERVICE ACT
The Public Service Act had i t s  origin with the creation of the 
f i r s t  Public U ti l i ty  Commission in 1913 under Act No. 2307.
This a c t ,  which was derived from the Public U t i l i ty  Laws of 
New Jeraej^ in the United S ta tes , was subsequently amended by 
Act Nos. 2362 and 1694. In 1923, the foregoing acts were 
expressly repealed and superseded by the Public Service Law 
known as Act No. 3108, which was amended by Act Nô ., 3139, 3153, 
3192, 3316, 3367, 3418, and 4033. On 7 November 1936, the fo re ­
going acts  were expressly repealed and superseded by the Public 
Service Act, known as Commonwealth Act No. 146, which was amended 
by Commonwealth Act No. 454, Republic Act No. 178, Presidential 
Decreee No. 1, and Executive Order No. 546 (1). *
In 1928, the Freight Rate System was estab lished. The present 
t a r i f f  was f i r s t  embodied in the In ter-Island  Transportation 
Rates, Rules and Regulations Revising Order No. 3 of the Public 
Service Commission (2).
The primary purpose of the Public Service Commission Law was to 
secure adequate and sustained service fo r the public a t  le a s t  
possible cost and to protect and conserve investments which had 
already been made for th a t  purpose. The Taw was enacted not only 
to protect the public against unreasonable charges and poor and 
in e f f ic ie n t  service , but also to prevent ruinous competition.
This was the main purpose in bringing under the ju r isd ic t io n  of 
the Public Service Commission (PSC) means of transporta tion , 
e lec tric-generating  p lan ts , etc. which catered to a limited 
portion of the public under private  agreements (3).
The PSC was abolished and replaced by specialised regulatory 
boards, among which was the Board of Transportation.: (BOT).
These boards were under the administrative supervision of the 
Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC).
* References
The BOT was composed of three divis ions, one of which was the 
Water Transportation Division (WTD). Among others ,  the import­
ant powers and functions of the WTD were as follows:
(a) To issue Cer t i f ica te  of Public Convenience (CPC) for  
the operation of water transportation u t i l i t i e s  and 
services,  such as domestic and overseas water ca r r ie rs  
and similar  public u t i l i t i e s ;
(b) To es tab l ish ,  prescribe and regulate routes , zones, 
and/or areas of operation of pa r t icu la r  operators of 
water service t ransports ,  and determine, f i x ,  and/or 
prescribe fa res ,  charges, and/or rates  pert inent to 
the operation of such u t i l i t y  f a c i l i t i e s  and 
services;
(c) To es tab l ish ,  f i x ,  and/or prescribe ru les ,  regulations,  
standards, and specif ications in a l l  cases rela ted  to 
the issued CPC's; and
(d) The BOT exercised i t s  ra te - se t t in g  functions in 
accordance with the specific  pol ic ies  prescribed by 
the MARINA in the determination of j u s t  and reasonable 
passenger fa re s ,  f re igh t  ra te s ,  and other charges 
re la t ive  to the operation of in te r - is land  vessels (4).
CHAPTER I I I
THE RATE STRUCTURE
Moves to re-s truc ture  the f re igh t  ra te  s tructure  were discussed 
as f a r  back in 1957 when the National Economic Council and the 
Public Service Commission, both defunct agencies, c ircula ted 
several memoranda and position papers recommending revis ions /  
modifications to the f re igh t  t a r i f f ,  to make i t  more responsive 
to the changing economic conditions in general and to the deve­
lopment in the in te r - is land  trade in p a r t icu la r .  Since 1928, 
across-the-board increases had generally been resorted to for  
adjustment of ra te  levels  due to changes in vessel operating 
costs .  However, the l i s t in g  and c la s s i f ica t io n  of commodities 
and the ra te  s tructure  were l e f t  unchanged (5).
The 1928 t a r i f f  s t ipula ted f re igh t  and passage rates between two 
ports. The cargo t a r i f f  made a d is t inc t ion  and l i s t e d  about 
600-700 specif ic  commodity items tha t  were grouped into f ive 
basic commodity classes (A, B, C, D, and ad valorem) and those 
tha t  were not individually iden t i f ied .  The l a t t e r  category was 
lumped into the highest rat ing of the general commodity c lass  A.
To compensate owners for  the increased r isk  involved in the 
transport  of high value cargoes, a surcharge of J percent was 
i n i t i a l l y  allowed in addition to the basic ra te  between the four 
commodity classes and th e i r  multiples- expressed in units  of 
e i the r  1000 KG or 1 CBM (F/T), whichever was higher, and fur ther  
d i f feren t ia ted  by distance.
Commodities classed as C were applied a distance fac tor  of 
75 percent of tha t  fo r  A, B, and D. While the basic commodity 
categorization took into account the volume/weight ra t ios  re la t ive  
to the cost  of providing shipping capaci ty, the d is tance-re la t ing 
component of the formula aimed to minimize the impact of rate  
differences from large spatia l  differences between points of 
production and consumption.
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The t a r i f f  was structured considering the cost of providing 
transport .  The fixed cost component ref lected the cost  of 
maintaining the route network with i t s  existing service leve l ,  
vessels , and other [ infras t ructure ,  whereas the variable compo­
nent ref lected the marginal cost of producing one additional 
ton-mile. This avoided d is to r t ions  over time and ensured that  
the ra te  levels  were appropriate i f  (a) inf la t ionary  ad jus t­
ments were applied in accordance with the basic principles 
underlying the t a r i f f  and (b) the rate  levels  ref lec t ing  the 
actual cost of transport  helped prevent giving rebates (6).
In 1928, the f ive basic classes were priced as shown in 
TABLE 1 below:
TABLE I 
(In Pesos per Freight Ton)
Class A: (i  ̂2.00 + -P .01 per mile)
Class B: (-P 1.50 +-P .01 per mile)
Class C: (-P 1.00 + -P .075 per mile)
Class D: ("P 6.00 + t  .01 per mile)
Ad Valorem: 1/2% of commodity value
The c la ss i f ica t io n  of commodities on property transported 
coastwise^ ports of the Philippine is lands ,  on c loser examina­
t ion ,  l i s t e d  a r t i c l e s  with no regard for  logic ,  consistency, or 
even a modicum of more e ffect ive  regulation.  I t  was simply a 
l i s t in g  of a r t i c l e s  and th e i r  c la s s i f i c a t io n ,  without any 
explanation, to Class A or B or C or D. Why should, fo r  instance, 
acids,  alcohol (admittedly chemicals) be lumped up with airplane 
and parts thereof and arms and ammunitions in Class A, suggesting 
perhaps an alphabetical manner of c la ss i f ica t ion?  I f  i t  was 
indeed so, why then should barometers (boxed) and blankets (in 
bales or cases) , or even books and boots and shoes (boxed) be 
likewise c la ss i f ied  under Class A?
This base-less  c la ss i f ica t ion  of commodities opened up new 
areas of problem rather  than actual ly  ass is ted  in the formula­
tion of an effect ive  system of ra te  structure-formula. So that  
even while the c la ss i f ica t io n  would s t i l l  stand as of the moment, 
i t s  app l icab i l i ty  ip terms of an improved f re igh t  ra te  system 
was a l l  a t  once open to question. For one thing, i t  gave too 
much discretion to the shippers since the loaders were, more 
often than not , not rea l ly  in a position to a t  l ea s t  inquire as 
to the basis of the commodity c la s s i f i c a t io n .  In th is  sense, 
therefore, i t  led to controversy ra ther  than accep tab i l i ty .
Perhaps a more meaningful and useful c la s s i f i ca t io n  would be the 
answer. But in the absence of such a more workable c l a s s i f i c a ­
t ion ,  the loaders were seemingly a t  the mercy of the shippers 
in the absence of regulatory off icers  a t  the scene of the 
loading. In most cases, the rates  were determined by the shippers 
and accepted by the loaders a t  the loading point,  following no 
regulations but perhaps using guidelines tha t  they remembered as 
basis for  the rates  agreed upon.
Successive across-the-board adjustments had generally been 
applied in the foregoing equations which, in the opinion of the 
Inter-Agency Freight Study Team, had d is tor ted  the struc tura l  
balance between the commodity and distance components of the 
equation. This had adversely affected the rates  on long distance 
links which tended to increase a t  a f a s t e r  pace than rates  on 
short distance l inks .  In respect to ad valorem cargoes, the 
study stated tha t  the revenue therefrom were grossly d is tor ted  
i f  ad valorem rates were re lated to the cost of providing t rans ­
port.  As a r e su l t  of d is to r t ions  in the t a r i f f  and fur ther  
compounded by under-uti lized cargo capacity of the f l e e t ,  granting 
rebates of varying magnitudes, typica l ly  anywhere from 15 to 
25 percent, had become a practice (7).
The increases approved by the BOT for  in te r - is land  shipping are 
shown in TABLE 2.
TABLE 2
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INCREASES APPROVED BY BOT FOR INTER-ISLAND 
SHIPPING_gVER_BASIC_(PRE:WM
CASE NO. FREIGHT RATES PASSENGER RATES
PERCENTAGE DATE PERCENTAGE DATE
12113 - 70% 7 Sept 1946 70% 7 Sept 1946
12113 - 10% 12 Jan 1950 10% 12 Jan 1950
132996 10% 22 May 1961 5% 22 May 1961
65-2670 - 18% 27 Dec 1965 10% 27 Dec 1965
69-6258 - 30% 28 Nov 1969 10% 28 Nov 1969
70-2023 - - - 20% 29 June 1970
70-4954 - 30% 10 Nov 1971 - -
73-18210 - 50% 8 Apr 1974 20% 8 Apr 1974
73-18240 - 15% 27 Jan 1976 15% 27 Jan 1976
77-34277 - 19% 29 Sept 1977 17% 29 Sept 1977
79-14554 - 29% 20 Aug 1979 20% 20 Aug 1979
79-14554 - 10% 25 Feb 1980 10% 25 Feb 1980
80-8683 - 10% 23 Oct 1980 12% 23 Oct 1980
81-1455 - 8% 14 Apr 1981 8% 14 Apr 1981
83-10405 - 8% 25 July 1983 15% 25 July 1983
(Suspended and ro lled  back e ffec tiv e)
( 5 Oct 1983 )
83-20017 - 30% 16 Nov 1983 30% 16 Nov 1983
84-6545 - 25% 21 June 1984 7% 21 June 1984
84-10684 - 20% 23 Nov 1984 7% 23 Nov 1984
5% 1 June 1985 - 2% 1 June 1985
(Roll back)
As of 16 November 1983, the cargo ra te  stru c tu re  was modified 
in a manner th a t ra te s  would vary with d istance. Both po rt- 
re la ted  and seatim e-related  components were formulated to 
decrease as the distance increased. Freight ra te s  approved by 
the MARINA as of 1 June 1985 are shown in TABLE 3.
TABLE 3 
(In Pesos per Freight Ton)
DISTANCE IN NAUTICAL MILES
0 TO 100 Class A: ( f 76.4712 +
O00LO per mile)
Class B: (-P61 .2066 + ■P .4624 per mile)
Class C: (-P49.7164 ■+ -P .3764 per mile)
Basic : (-P27.3439 + -P .2070 per mile)
101 TO 300 Class A: (■f62.9850 + -P .5394 per mile)
Class B: (■f50.3880 + -P .4313 per mile)
Class C: (-P40.9511 + -P .3512 per mile)
Basic : (■P22.5198 + ■P .1931 per mile)
Above 300 Class A: (-f49.4988 + -P .5009' per mile)
Class B: (-P39.6141 + -P .4001 per mile)
Class C: (-f32.1841 + -P .3260 per mile)
Basic : ef17.7014 + -P .1793 per mile)
Upon i t s  establishm ent in July 1974, the MARINA took the lead 
ro le  in pursuing the re -s tru c tu rin g  e f fo r t .  A Jo in t Committee, 
composed of five  represen tatives from each of the government 
agencies concerned with shipping; four from the shipowners/ 
operators sec to r, and four from the shippers group, was formed.
To co rrect the d is to rtio n s  in the ra te  s tru c tu re  caused by
across-the-board increases, the Inter-Agency Freight Rate 
Study recommended three a l te rna t ive  s tructures  which proposed 
a reduction in commodity classes from the existing 15 to only 
e i the r  6, 8, or 10 c lasses .  To date, however, the Inter-Agency 
Freight Rate Project remains to be completed and the mechanics 
of implementation s t i l l  remainsto be discussed with both 
shippers and shipowners and operators. Whether the scheme 
would be practicable or not remained to be seen (8) .  Moreover, 
lack of funding support,  together with divergent views regarding 
commodity c la s s i f i c a t io n ,  number of commodity c lasses ,  etc. led 
to the discontinuance of the project.
A closer  study of the ra te  s tructure  revealed tha t :
(a) cross-subsidizat ion existed between d i f fe ren t  commodity 
c lasses ,  with ad valorem and c lass  A and class B 
commodities subsidizing those of c lass  C; in short ,  the 
t a r i f f  was not based on the cost of providing the 
service, but on the value of the cargo and i t s  capacity 
to pay.
(b) before November 1983, higher returns were provided for 
longer distance t r ip s  as compared to short distance 
hauls; thus, for  an operator serving route links of 
varying lengths, the longer hauls subsidized the shorter  
routes. The ra te  formula, as i t  was then structured,  
had a b u i l t - in  bias in favor of operators serving 
longer route links (9).
Due to observed serious deficiencies of the f re igh t  ra te  system 
currently  used in the in te r - is land  shipping operations - 
involving vessels operating on a fixed route and on a re la t ive ly  
fixed schedule - coupled with complaints raised by both shippers 
and shipowners, the MARINA saw the need for  revising the 1928 
Freight Rate System. Among these deficiencies might be l i s t e d  
the following:
(a) The existing t a r i f f  s t ructure  fa i led  to include numerous
commodities which entered the trade since 1928 but 
s t i l l  included commodities which disappeared from 
the trade.  New commodities were automatically 
charged as e i the r  class A or the ad valorem ra te .
j[b) The c la s s i f ica t io n  of many commodities did not 
follow th e i r  re la t ive  values which had changed.
Rates were, therefore ,  out of proportion to the 
commodities' cost of production.
(c) The t a r i f f  became dual: ad valorem rates  for  .com­
modities of value (value of over 1 ,000 per ton
or cubic meter) which did not give consideration to 
distance and specif ic  class  r a te s ,  based on distance 
and cost  of service ,  for  a l l  the other commodities. 
There was no corre lat ion between these two sub­
systems .
(d) The in te rpre ta t ion  of Section 28 (cargoes of value) 
of the 1928 t a r i f f  resulted in the growing propor­
tion of cargo priced ad valorem. Cargoes of value 
as defined in the 19E8 t a r i f f  fe l l  a r t i c l e s  such as 
cinema fi lms,  a r t i c l e s  of gold and s i l v e r ,  jewelries;, 
precious stones, and similar a r t i c l e s  whose values 
were grea ter  than T  1,000 per cubic meter or ton, for  
which ad valorem rates  were s t ipu la ted .  However, a t  
the present time, because of inf la t ion  since 1928, 
a r t i c l e s  l ike  t e x t i l e s ,  shoes and c lo thing, machinery, 
e lec t r ica l  appliances, paints and v i r tu a l ly  a l l  manu­
factures would be considered as cargoes of value 
since th e i r  values were greater  than T 1,000 per cubic 
meter or ton and, therefore ,  were now freighted
ad valorem.
(e) Due to the present in terpreta t ion  of Section 28, the 
overall f re igh t  increases covered not only the class 
rates but also the ad valorem ra te s ,  which thus rose 
from the 1928 level of 0.5 percent per V  1,000 of value 
to 4.2 percent in 1977 i rrespect ive  of inf la t ionary  
increases in prices. Thus, commodities whose
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monetary value increased to reach f-1 ,000 per cubic 
meter or ton due to in f la t ion  in e f fec t  bore increased 
rates  twice. This made the gap between the ad valorem 
rates and the class  rates  very wide and th is  became wider 
with every approved over-all ra te  increase and because 
of in f la t ion .
(f) Current rates  favored’ long-distance hauls and d i s ­
criminated against  short hauls. I t  was found out th a t  for 
shorter  distances about 40 percent of the cargo were 
priced ad valorem, while for  longer distances c lass  ft 
commodities - where distance was considered - predomin­
ated since the resul t ing ra te  was higher than the
ad valorem rate  which remained the same regardless of 
distance.
(g) The rates  supported an in e f f ic ien t  shipping network 
characterized by over-tonnaging, vessel obsolescence, 
duplication of services with no regard for optimum f r e ­
quency and too many ports of call per route (10).
Tari f f  ra te  adjustments had generally been across-the-board since 
1928. The process in evaluating any pe ti t ion for  ra te  increase 
had been a s t ra ig h t  forward approach for  calculating the percent­
age difference between the actual (or a t  l e a s t  reported) revenue of 
shipping companies and the revenue required to enable them to 
rea l ize  a 12 percent return on investment in f loat ing asses ts  plus 
two-month working c a p i ta l ,  net of in te res t  expense but before 
income tax. ft s l igh t  improvement in the process was introduced in 
1977 by taking into consideration the income-reducing e f fec t  of the 
c a r r i e r ' s  tax on the incremental revenue a r is ing  from the ra te  
adjustment (11).
CHAP TER I V
FORMULAS USED FOR EVALUATION OF APPLICATION FOR RATE INCREASES
A. Return on Investment (ROI)
ROI = (REVENUES - NET OPERATING EXPENSES) x 100/RATE BASE = 12% 
where:
REVENUES = FREIGHT + PASSAGE REVENUES
NET OPERATING EXPENSES = VESSEL OPERATING EXPENSES +
TERMINAL OPERATING EXPENSES + 
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES 
- (DEPRECIATION + AMORTIZATION 
OF LEASEHOLD IMPROVEMENTS + 
INTEREST’+ DONATIONS + 
REPRESENTATION + TAXES & LICENSES)
RATE BASE = BOOK VALUE OF ASSETS + APPRAISAL INCREMENT + 
OPERATING CAPITAL
OPERATING CAPITAL = 1/6 x (ALLOWABLE EXPENSES -
NON-CASH EXPENSES)
B. Required Revenue (RR)
RR = 0.12 X (RATE BASE + ALLOWABLE EXPENSES)
C. Rate of Revenue Adjustment (RRA)
RRA = ((RR - REVENUES)/REVENUES) x 100
T
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The ra te  adjustment process appeared to be based on the assumption 
that :
(a) a 12 percent ra te  of return on float ing assets  plus 
two-month working capita l  would s t i l l  induce quali f ied 
investors to provide and maintain an e f f i c ie n t  shipping 
service;
(b) the average u t i l i z a t io n  ra te  of the vessels did not 
change before and a f t e r  the ra te  adjustment; and
(c) the financial statements on which the adjustment calcula­
tions were based were accurate and factual (12).
The rate  of return on float ing assets  plus two-month working 
capital equivalent to 12 percent had been considered by the PSC, 
and the BOT as the "reasonable ra te  of return".  This ra te  had 
been applied consistently  by the PSC and l a t e r  by the BOT for  
over 50 years in sp i te  of the increase of cost of capita l  from 
12 percent in the early 30's to anywhere from 20 to 35 percent a t  
present. In October 1984, i t  rose to as high as 60 percent. This 
discrepancy between the prevailing opportunity cost ra te  and the 
"reasonable rate" se t  by the PSC and the BOT had been an issue 
brought up by shipowners and operators in th e i r  dialogues with 
government agencies. The government's position had always been 
to caution shipping companies tha t  i f  such "reasonable rate" 
was increased for  a pa r t icu la r  transport  sector ,  a l l  other modes 
of transport  would demand the same treatment.
Before the consolidation of bus companies in 1974, the Bus 
Operators Association of the Philippines also raised the same issue 
and the same arguments were presented by the government. Mean­
while, the rate  gap had become more serious such tha t  the adoption 
of the current reasonable rate  of return would resu l t  to dras t ic  
changes in t a r i f f  levels .  On the other hand, the antiquated 
"reasonable ra te  of return" had continued to induce shipowners and 
operators to resor t  to the generation of non-factual f inancial 
statements (13).
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In addition to the magnitude of the "reasonable ra te  of 
re tu rn" , adjustment process i t s e l f  did not assure shipowners 
and operators of a f a i r  return on investments. Rate increases 
were based on costs reported during the immediately preceding 
year and on other costs with determinable ra tes of increase, 
e .g . ,  co llec tive  bargaining agreements, fuel price increase, 
and other costs affected by the fuel price adjustments; the 
computations fo r required ra te  increase, therefo re , merely 
checked i f  the 12 percent ra te  of return could be realized 
and, i f  not, an adjustment to a t ta in  the 12 percent ra te  of 
return would be granted. In other.words, the process of 
adjusting ra tes i n i t i a l l y  involved a perceived return below the 
"reasonable rate" and attempts were then made to resto re  th is  
level of p ro f i ta b i l i ty .  Previously, evaluations fo r ra te  
increases took two to six months before any provisional increase 
was granted, so tha t  the shipowners and operators had to contend 
with low p ro f i t  margins, i f  not losses. Presently, ra te  
increase evaluations by the MARINA would not exceed one month.
The 12 percent ra te  of return se t by the defunct PSC and the BOT 
was quite u n re a l is t ic .  The ra te  adjustment process did not even 
assure tha t  th is  low ra te  of return would be realized by the 
shipowners and operators. I t  only brought up the levels of the 
p ro f i ta b i l i ty ,  oftentimes a t  a slow pace, to 12 percent period i­
ca lly  when shipping ra tes were evaluated; thus, the ra te  of 
return being granted was in e ffec t  below 12 percent. These 
aspects of implementation discouraged additional investments in 
ships and/or induced existing operators to "doctor" financial 
reports as a recourse for survival (14).
Traffic  volumes changed from year to year regardless of the 
e la s t ic i ty  of demand for shipping services with respect to ra te s ;  
likewise, vessel u t i l iz a t io n ' ra tes  or load fac tors changed, 
especially  when the aggregate capacity of authorized vessels 
also changed.
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Since the current  process of adjusting rates  did not consider the 
changes in ra te s ,  t r a f f i c ,  and available tonnage, i t  became pos­
s ib le  tha t  rates were se t  re la t ive ly  low because the load factors 
of the vessels in the previous year were high. If  such average 
load factors  involved overloading during peak seasons, these new 
rates  would in e f fec t  encourage the continuance of the previous 
period 's  overloading practice in order to a t t a in  the estimated 
revenue tha t  provided a f a i r  return.  However, i f  large d e f ic i t s  
resul ted due to the low u t i l i z a t io n  of vessels , i t  could be said 
tha t  the rate  adjustment passed on to the ship users the cost of 
overtonnaging.
The ra te  base currently  used to assess the magnitude of the 
allowable return consisted of the appraised value of f loat ing 
assets  and the working capital equivalent to two months of oper­
ating expenses. The intention of the policy which considered the 
appraisal increments as part  of the ra te  base was to enable ship­
owners and operators to generate funds for  the replacement of 
th e i r  vessels . Such appraisal increments provided investors a 
return on the increment which never involved any cash outlay from 
them. Since the minimum a t t r ac t iv e  ra te  of return on current 
investments should be granted to fos te r  continuity of the service, 
an adjustment of the ra te  base to the current value s t i l l  remained 
appropriate and f a i r  to the investor (15).
A firm should be able to earn revenues tha t  would compensate 
investors of both debt and equity c ap i ta l .  These payments would 
be in the form of in te re s t  and prof i ts  (which could be expressed 
e i the r  in the form of dividends or retained earnings).  Capital 
would be j u s t  as much a factor  of production as would be labor.- 
and land resources. I f  a firm would not be able to reward cap i ta l ,  
then assuredly the lack of p ro f i t  opportunity would send a signal 
to the capita l markets tha t  investors should seek a l te rna t ive  
investments. The inab i l i ty  to a t t r a c t  capita l would, therefore,  
erode the investment base and over time the firm would be forced 
to reduce the level of service i t  would offer  the public. Thus,
i t  would be important tha t  a regulatory commission would permit 
a regulated firm to earn a reasonable ra te  of return (16).
In the application of the ra te  base two aspects would be worth 
mentioning. F i r s t l y ,  the exis ting ra te  evaluation procedure 
appeared to lack any safeguard against  unscrupulous appraisers 
who might report excessive valuations which would re su l t  to high 
ra te  increases.  Asset appraisals were conducted usually for  the 
purpose of negotiating loans with financing companies and for 
supporting a pe t i t ion  for  ra te  increase. A review of some ap­
praisals  in previous pe t i t ions  with the BOT revealed some 
questionable valuations. Since valuation reports were normally 
prepared without prejudice to the appra isers , some companies had 
no qualms in simply making th e i r  c l ien ts  happy. I t  appeared 
tha t  an accredita t ion of appraisal companies and a review of 
valuation reports by the MARINA became appropriate . Secondly, 
the ra te  base appeared prejudicial to bareboat - charterers  and 
ship operators who did not own the ships they operated. These 
e n t i t i e s  generally compensated shipowners for  the cost of the 
ship plus returns on owner's investment which were v i r tua l ly  
unregulated (17).
The second aspect had become more relevant since the Central Bank 
of the Phil ippines, because of the country's low foreign exchange 
reserves,  re s t r i c te d  importations of vessels .  With the growing 
trend of ships being chartered for  in te r - is land  operations, the 
extent of investments in proportion to f l e e t  capacity was expected 
to decline. Since the ra te  base for  the charterers  and pure ship 
operators consisted only of working c a p i ta l ,  the marginal returns 
as compared to the business r isks discouraged chartering of 
vessels; but i f  importations continued to be t o ta l ly  r e s t r i c te d ,  
chartering remained as the most logical mode of acquiring vessels 
and the magnitude of the ra te  base encouraged charterers  to 
prepare fraudulent reports .
In most of the developed maritime countr ies ,  i t  might be noted
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tha t  the shipowning, the ship management, and the ship operating 
functions were usually decentralized;  shipowners entrusted the i r  
vessels to professional ship management and/or operating companies. 
Each en t i ty  involved, from the owners to the managers and f ina l ly  
to the charterers  and ship operators,  derived earning depending 
on market conditions.
I f  the government, with i t s  low foreign exchange reserves, would 
have to depend on chartering as the necessary and most practical  
mode of securing the future tonnage requirements, i t  would be 
necessary tha t  the "rate  base" used when chartering be reviewed. 
While there could be possible a l t e rn a t ive s ,  such as the inclusion 
of "reserve funds" in the determination of the invested capital 
or the capi ta l iza t ion  of leased asse ts ,  i t  was believed tha t  the 
most logical approach was to change the method for determining 
ra te  adjustment. This would be taken up in the l a t t e r  part  of 
th is  study where the formulas and method presented by the UNCTAD 
Secre tar ia t  would be discussed.
The Shipdeco of Norway-Marina Team on Standard Ship Design com­
mented tha t  the f re igh t  ra te  and l icense system should be changed. 
The f re igh t  ra te  system should be used as an instrument to im­
prove eff iciency by means of a ra te  s tructure  tha t  would lead to 
minimum overall costs .  Basically open competition on the routes 
and/or maximum fre igh t  rates should be preferred, but a system 
based on load factor  and eff iciency would be considerably be t te r  






Method and Formula Used by U.S. FMC
In the United Sta tes ,  shipping rates  would be regulated by the 
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). The process of calculating 
a reasonable ra te  of return for  a regulated company, such as 
Company X, would require the calculation of a ra te  of return 
earned by companies which would be comparable to Company X.
The f i r s t  step in th is  process would be to identify a data base 
from which a reasonable estimate of the average ra te  of return 
of major U.S. corporations would be made and then adjustments 
would be made for  r isk  and trends in rates  of return and in te res t  
ra te s ,  i f  necessary, to find the ra te  of return Company X should 
have the opportunity to earn that  would a t t r a c t  capita l in the 
future and would maintain the in tegr i ty  of existing capita l 
investments.
A c a r r ie r  operating in the domestic offshore trades should be 
permitted the opportunity to earn a ra te  of return on i t s  ra te  
base tha t  would re f le c t  the price the firm would have to pay to 
secure debt and equity cap i ta l .  From an inves tor 's  perspect ive, 
such a ra te  of return should be comparable to investments of 
s imilar r i sk .  The FMC would adopt the comparable earnings t e s t  
to measure the reasonableness of a c a r r i e r ' s  ra te  of return .
The f i r s t  point to be addressed in a comparable earnings t e s t  
would be the universe of firms from which an average ra te  of 
return or benchmark could be derived. In various dockets involv­
ing shipping companies, the FMC would find the reference group of 
U.S. manufacturing corporations to be the best sample of firms 
from which to develop a benchmark ra te  of return. The data from 
which the benchmark ra te  of return for  manufacturing corporations 
could be computed would be published in the Bureau of the Census
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Quarterly Financial Reports (QFR). From these data , the return on 
to ta l  capital could be developed. While the return on to ta l  
capita l would not precisely be the same as the return on the ra te  
base, i t  would be a good approximation and furthermore would be 
the approach specified in the Code of Federal Regulations.
The FMC's General Order 11 would specify th a t  the following re tu rn ­
on-rate-base formula be used to determine a c a r r i e r 's  ra te  of
return:
Rate of Return 
on Rate Base
Net Income In te re s t
After Taxes + Expense
Rate Base
The return on ra te  base would measure the return to investors who 
would have provided the funds to finance the purchase of a c a r r i e r 's  
a s se ts ,  which would be represented by the ra te  base. Unfortunately, 
data would not be available fo r calculating the return on "rate 
base" fo r  manufacturing firms. The FMC would use the return on 
to ta l  capita l formula as a proxy for the ra te  base formula, because 
"total cap ita l"  would represent the source of funds used to pur­
chase asse ts  such as those found in the ra te  base. The return on 
to ta l capita l formula would be:
Net Income In te re s t  Charges
Return on _ After Taxes + on Long-Term Debt
Total Capital Stockholders' Long-Term
Equity + Debt
In the equation, one could see th a t  the return on to ta l  capital 
could be separated into two parts : net income would be the return
to stockholders (equity) a n d 'in te re s t  expense on long-term debt 
would be the return to debt holders (debt). Figures fo r  long-term 
debt, net income and stockholders' equity would be published in 
the Bureau of the Census publication, the Quarterly Financial 
Reports. The only figure th a t  would have to be calculated would 
be the in te re s t  expense on long-term debt. This would be d e te r­
mined by examining newly issued corporate bond yields over a certa in
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time ■ span and taking the moving average for  the l a t e s t  
pa r t icu lar  number of years (19).
However, the absence in the country of data such as those obtain­
able from the QFR, as well as the corporate bond y ie ld s ,  would 
rule out the use of th is  FMC method.
One formula (20) fo r  determining f re igh t  for  in te r - i s land  shipping, 
used in Indonesia, was studied,  as follows:
Freight Rate for  Inter-Island Shipping
M = Commodity c la ss i f ica t io n  .coef f ic ien t
D = Distance cost
= Cost/ton/nautical mile x distance,  n. mile
F = Proportional fac to r ,  i.,e„ extra cost element, 
percent of other elements as: 
Commission/accounting cost claims/cargo 
handling equipment
Freight rebate margin/contract margin 
Prof i t  margin, etc .
L = Load fac tor
C = Port expense as:
Pilotage/towage 
Mooring ass is tance ,  etc.
Cl = Call expense in port of origin
C2 = Call expense in port of dest ination




PI = Berthing cost  in loading port
P2 = Berthing cost in dest ination port
H = Efficiency fac tor  in port
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H1 = Efficiency fac tor  in loading port
H2 = Efficiency fac tor  in dest ination port
M varies from 1 to 2.5 (in Indonesia)
I t  could be seen from th is  formula th a t  the f re igh t  to be paid 
by the shippers depended on the distance, the vessel expenses in 
ports , and the c la ss i f ica t io n  of the goods shipped.
The formula had three main components, namely: -
(a) the sea component: ^  ,
( C1 + C2 ^ ^  )
(b) the port component: F  ̂  ̂ H2 ’
(c) the commodity c la ss i f ica t io n  component: M.
However, while th is  formula took into consideration the load 
fac tor  and the eff iciency factors in the loading and the dest ina­
tion ports ,  the various components of th is  formula such as the 
comnodity c la ss i f ica t ion  component, the extra cost elements, the 
port expenses, etc., would e n ta i l ,  based on experience, a l o t  of 
work, with the figures obtained no b e t te r  than mere estimates. 
Moreover, the commodity c la ss i f ica t io n  component would be very 
subjective as i t s  value could cover a wide range.
The proper c la ss i f ica t ion  of a pa r t icu la r  commodity, more often 
than not, had always been the subject of lengthy and time- 
consuming discussions.
Another formula looked into was the "Rate Fixation Formulas of 
Short-Distance and Long-Distance Liner Shipping Conferences" 
which appeared in a paper prepared by the Regional Adviser and 
the Consultant,  Freight Study Units, during the Regional Workshop 
on Freight Study Units, held in Bombay, India, in 1979, sponsored 
by the Economic and Social Commission for  Asia and the Pacific 
of the United Nations.
Long-Term Rate Fixation Equation
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The nature of equation to be estimated was given as follows (21):
r =  l < Q . d ' ^ 1 . p ' ^ 2 . s ' ^ 3 ! e
where:
r  = Basic f re igh t  ra te  of a commodity (measured 
by the ad valorem rate  of f re igh t  per unit  
distance)
d = Distance carr ied of commodity (in nautical 
miles)
p = Unit value of the commodity (in US dollars  
per tonne)
s = Stowage fac tor  of the commodity (in cubic 
meters per tonne)
k k k1> 2> 3 = E la s t i c i t i e s  (given as numerical 
coeff ic ients)
= A numerical constant which stood fo r  the
general level of the basic ra tes  as influenced 
by a ll  other factors  (such as the ship s ize ,  
i t s  average u t i l i z a t i o n ,  and costs to  the 
shipowners)
e = The standard e rror  of the basic ra te  of the 
commodity (or the standard deviation of the 
differences between the actual rates and the 
computed rates  from the equation, which were 
a t t r ib u ta b le ,  among other things ,  to the 
uncertain elements in the stowage fac to r ,  
while the influence of the systematic element 
in stowage fac tor  was measured by kg).
The numerical values of k^, k^, kg, kg and e in the fo re ­
going equation when estimated s t a t i s t i c a l l y  would indicate both 
the level and s tructure  of the basic rates  of a group of conferences
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operating in a region. As such, the equation might be taken as 
the ra te  f ixation equation or formula for  the group.
Once the level and structure  of the basic ra tes  had been known 
from the ra te  f ixation equation, the more complex s tructure  of 
f re igh t  charges of d i f fe ren t  commodities for  d i f fe ren t  distances 
could be derived d i rec t ly  by multiplying the basic ra te  of each 
commodity (derived from the equation) by the corresponding d i s ­
tance i t  was carr ied .  The resulting f re igh t  charges would be 
in ad valorem. I f ,  however, the absolute f re igh t  charges were 
required, they could each be derived by simply multiplying the 
ad valorem fre igh t  charge of each commodity so derived by the 
corresponding unit  value of the commodity.
Examination of the formula would reveal tha t  to determine the 
numerical values of the e l a s t i c i t i e s  and the long-term f ixation 
equations for  the short-distance ra te  and the long-distance ra te  
some knowledge of s t a t i s t i c s  would be necessary.
Much simpler computations which could be readily  understood by 




In countries where shipping was not regulated,  l in e r  f re igh t  
ra tes  were fixed by individual conferences on the basis of 
cer tain  principles and considerations.  However, the market 
forces of demand and supply had potent influence. The shipping 
l ines  engaged in l in e r  trade ply on fixed route regular ly ,  on 
the basis of pre-determined schedules and carr ied an assortment 
of small consignments of several cargoes. Their voyages were 
fixed and committed in advance and had to carry whatever cargo 
was available  a t  the time of sa i l ing .  The l ines  maintained a 
network of agencies in a l l  the areas where th e i r  ships plied.
They had to cover the operating and maintenance costs of ships, 
pay in te re s t  on loans, arid a f t e r  a reasonable operating period 
earn a sa t i s fac to ry ,  or sometimes a low, ra te  of return on 
capita l invested in the business. They also had to meet the 
expenses of annual drydocking and quadrennial ship surveys to 
maintain the class  of th e i r  ships and expenses of contingencies 
which could not be foreseen, such as c o l l i s io n ,  damages to cargoes 
aris ing therefrom, s t r ik e s ,  port congestions, e tc .
The cost s t ruc ture  of a l in e r  company generally included general 
overhead, se l l ing overhead, marine overhead, ve sse l ' s  overhead, 
voyage costs ,  and variable costs .
The majority of the costs in operating a l in e r  vessel would be 
outside the control of the shipping l ine .  The l in e r  owner or 
operator could do very l i t t l e  when fuel costs ,  port charges, 
wages, stevedoring cos t ,  etc., would escalate .
The Cost of Service Principle
In order to give a continuous and regular shipping service a l in e r  
operator must determine f re igh t  rates  to cover a l l  the afore-
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mentioned costs and make a reasonable margin of p ro f i t .  The 
f re igh t  so determined would be the cost of rendering the service 
and formed the lower l imits  of the rates so tha t  the to ta l  f re ight  
earned would not be less than the actual cost of service.  This 
concept must be considered an important principle on the supply 
side.
The Value of Service Principle
The f re igh t  must be a t  a level which enabled the t r a f f i c  to move, 
ve.,  a t  a level which must not be such a burden tha t  the business 
became non-competitive; otherwise what would obtain would be a 
"nice" f re igh t  ra te  but without cargo. I f  the f re igh t  became so 
high as to exceed the value of service,  the goods would not be 
shipped by the operator. Thus the upper l im it  of the f re igh t  
rates  depended on the value of the service rendered and the upper 
l im i t  must be so determined tha t  when goods would be sold a t  
dest ination in sp i te  of f re ights  rates being high, there would 
s t i l l  be a reasonable margin of p ro f i t  for  the s e l l e r .  This must 
be considered an important fac tor  on the demand side of shipping 
service.
What the Traffic Could Bear
The l in e r  f re igh t  rates must be a t  a level which would enable the 
ship to pay i t s  way. If  the f re igh t  rates  were based on the cost 
of service alone, the margin of p rof i ts  would be very small. I f ,  
on the other hand, the value of service principle  alone was applied, 
the p rof i ts  might be high but the f re igh t  s tructure  would go up, 
leaving very l i t t l e  incentive for  the shippers to se l l  the cargoes. 
So the conferences divided the goods in several categories taking 
into account "what the t r a f f i c  could bear". Conferences fixed 
rates  a t  levels  designed to a t t r a c t  t r a f f i c ,  a t  ra tes  tha t  would 
cause cargo to move, thus promoting trade. There must be many 
factors affecting the cost of services or the value of services or 
both which in turn would ultimately a f fec t  f re igh t  ra te s .
Generally, conferences could be secretive about the principle  on
28
which they could decide f re igh t  ra te s .  Rates might be based 
s t r i c t l y  on costs ,  rates might be h i s to r i c a l ,  ra tes  might have no 
rational basis on costs ,  and rates  might be according to what the 
t r a f f i c  could bear. Sometimes, under th is  p r inc ip le ,  ra tes  could 
be below the cost of transporting a commodity.
Conference Rate Procedure
Before the f re igh t  for  a pa r t icu la r  commodity could be determined, 
the conference would need su f f ic ien t  data to enable i t  to make 
reasonable estimates of out-of-pocket expenses and revenue which 
the t r a f f i c  could bear. The excess of revenue over net out-of- 
pocket cost might usually be the index of d e s i r a b i l i ty  for  the 
•rate of tha t  par t icu la r  commodity. Conference would generally ask 
the applicant to f i l l  in a form called "application for  f re igh t  
rate" which the conference had prepared for  the applicant .
Although these forms vary from conference to conference, v i r tua l ly  
a l l  of them cal led for  information such as the trade name of the 
commodity, the description of the a r t i c l e ,  whether i t  was l iquid 
or solid form, whether i t  was in paste,  f lake ,  powdered or granu­
lated form, e tc .  The willingness and a b i l i ty  of shippers to pay a 
given f re igh t  would depend largely on the value of goods and the 
applicant , therefore ,  must s ta te  the value per un i t  a t  the port 
of loading. Virtual ly a l l  conferences also sought specif ic  
information on the competition which the goods must meet in the 
trade.
After obtaining the form duly f i l l e d  in ,  the conference would 
establ ish  f re igh t  rates  by any one of the following three methods:
1. By a rb i t ra ry  system, where the conference ju s t  
fixed a cer tain  ra te  without any supporting reasons;
2. In consultation with the shippers, a ra te  was fixed 
depending on how much a l in e r  operator would need 
and how much the shipper could afford to pay;
3. By a formula system, whereby generally the to ta l
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costs and income of recent voyages (including 
agreed levels of in te res t  on capita l and depre­
ciation) were calculated to see whether too much 
p ro f i t  or loss ,  i f  any, had been made and to 
adjust  the new fre ight  ra te  accordingly.
Conference ra te s ,  therefore ,  would be basically  of two types: 
dlass ra tes  and Commodity ra te s .  A class ra te  would re la te  to a 
number, cal led a ra t ing ,  which represented many commodities. A 
commodity ra te  would re la te  to a ra te  sta ted on a specif ic  com­
modity of a pa r t icu la r  description. Taking into account the 
various factors  tha t  affected l ine r  ra te s ,  rates for  each class  
of t r a f f i c ,  and for  each port of the route must be compiled in 
the form of schedules, const i tut ing a common t a r i f f  for  a l l  
member l ines .
The commodity or class  rates  could s t i l l  be divided into sub­
sections for  d i f fe ren t  ranges of loading and discharging ports 
for  items l ike  chemicals and engineering goods, where stowage 
factors,handling expenses, value and other charac te r i s t ic s  widely 
differed.  There might be more than one ra te  entry in the t a r i f f .  
There would l ike ly  be additional items, fo r  example, "Chemicals n .o . s .  
(not otherwise specified) or "Engineering Goods n.o.e" (not 
otherwise enumerated), when a pa r t icu la r  varie ty of commodity did 
not f i t  in any of the other commodities mentioned in the t a r i f f .
The major task then before a conference was the preparat ion, 
publicat ion, and revision of t a r i f f s .  The, t a r i f f s ,  beside giving 
the schedule of r a te s ,  should also contain rules and regulations 
regarding the proper application of ra te s .  Sometimes a conference 
might declare rates on cer tain  cargo as "open" thereby permitting 
the member l ines to charge any ra te  on such cargoes. Generally, 
a l l  bulk cargoes must be declared open-rated cargoes and once 
they had been so declared open-rated, the conference could no 
longer consider i t  i t s  duty to provide them coverage.
General Rate Increases
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Usually an advance notice of any increase in f re ig h t  ra te  should 
be given by the conference e i th e r  under a contractual arrangement 
with the shippers or through a consultation procedure agreed to 
by the conference with the shippers' association . In some trades , 
the national leg is la t io n  might oblige the conference to give 
advance notice of a ra te  increase to the shippers and the 
government.
General ra te  increases could be of two types: (a) General ra te
increases to cover increases in cost of operation which might have 
occurred over a period, fo r example, in f la t io n ,  stevedoring cost,  
port charges, wages, etc, increasing over a period; and 
(b) surcharges to cover sudden r i s e  in the cost of operation due, 
fo r  example, to an ac t of war or a congestion in a port. The 
usual types of surcharges, in th is  regard, would include Port 
Congestion Surcharge, Bunker Surcharge, Currency Adjustment Factor 
covering the r i s e  or depreciation in the value of currency. War 
Risk Surcharge, Deviation Surcharge covering, fo r  example, closure 
of a canal. E ssen tia lly , the surcharge should be regarded as a 
temporary phenomenon, imposed to cover a sudden r is e  in the costs 
of operation which was not expected to be permanent.
Surcharge being of a temporary phenomenon, conferences must be 
free  to impose the same as and when necessary; however, i f  general 
increases in basic f re ig h t  ra tes  would be a ffec ted , the conferences 
would then be obliged to give reasonably su f f ic ie n t  notice to 
enable the shippers to make forward contracts . Developing 
countries had been organizing shippers, strengthening th e i r  assoc i­
a tions , and promoting understanding and co-operation between 
shippers and shipowners. Shippers from developing countries should 
follow a procedure in approaching shipping lines  fo r  adjustment in 
f re ig h t  ra tes  in cases where such ra tes were considered high, 
anomalous, or discriminatory. A so-called "Discussion Formula" 
was evolved under which i t  became obligatory on the part of 
conferences to give adequate notice to shippers f re ig h t  increases
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and hold discussions with them before giving e ffe c t  to such 
increases.
Standard Format
To fu rther  the objective of bringing about c loser rapport between 
shippers and shipowners in order to enable them to conduct 
meaningful consultations and negotiations in matters of mutual 
in te re s t ,  a "standard format" had been evolved in which the 
conferences would be required to furnish a l l  relevant data to the 
shippers' organizations to ju s t i fy  any f re ig h t increase proposed 
by them. The format should l i s t  out the de ta iled  headings 
re la ting  to earnings and expenses including depreciation and 
return on c a p i ta l ,  which information should be furnished by the 
conferences.
In regard to depreciation, the format should require th a t  i t  be 
calculated on h is to r ica l  cost although some conferences had been^ 
adopting replacement cost fo r  the purpose while submitting data in 
support of f re igh t increases.
At the same time the format should recognize th a t  in view of the 
escalations in the prices of new ships, depreciation calculated 
on h is to r ica l  cost might not be adequate fo r  meeting the replace­
ment cost. Provision must, therefo re , be made in the format fo r a 
claim for reh ab ili ta t io n  allowance being made by the conference in 
cases where there could be a ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  such an allowance.
The format should not require any specific  ra te  of return on 
capital to be claimed by conferences and i t  should be l e f t  fo r  
negotiations between the parties  concerned. The format, however, 
must contain an important guideline to be followed by conferences 
in th is  connection, v iz . :  the ra te  of return to be claimed on
borrowed capital should be lower than th a t  on paid-up c a p i ta l ,  
primarily because in te re s t  charges on borrowed cap ita l had been 
admitted as an item of expenditure in the format.
Consistent with the U.N. Code of Conduct fo r Liner Conferences, the 
format must envisage th a t  there should be f re ig h t  s t a b i l i ty  fo r  a t  
le a s t  15 months between two general f re ig h t  increases and a t  le a s t  
five  months between two f re ig h t  ra te  increases.
Liner Conference Pricing
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Shipping l i t e ra tu re  tended to contain a lo t  of theories tha t  
seek to give the ra tionale  fo r price se t ting  by l in e r  conferences.
Sturmey (22) s ta ted  th a t  l in e r  conferences established deterrent 
prices ra ther than se t prices in order to maximize p ro f i ts .
Deterrent prices pertained to those th a t  would y ie ld  reasonable 
p ro f i ts  to the l in e r  in a given route but would not a t t r a c t  extra 
competition. Heaver (23) supported Sturmey's view th a t  l in e r  
conferences did not seek to maximize p ro f i ts  in price se t t in g .  
Although maintaining the s ta b i l i ty  of prices and regulating the 
capacity of shipping would be favorable to trade , they could be 
against p ro f i t  maximization. Heaver concluded tha t  a rational 
explanation fo r  the price se tting  by l in e r  conferences could 
maximize a conference's revenue subject to a minimum-profit con­
s t r a in t .  As an a l te rn a t iv e ,  Heaver argued th a t  l in e r  conferences 
emerged to be price discriminators in the se tting  of p r ices ,  i. e„ 
they sought to charge what the market could bear in order to maxi­
mize th e ir  revenue subject to minimum-profit cons tra in t.  In other 
words, charging what the market could bear meant charging higher­
valued goods a higher l in e r  ra te  than lower-valued commodities (24).
The goals of l in e r  conferences had been generally s ta ted  to pro­
mote trade for the common good of c a r r ie rs  and shippers; hence,
Laing (25) argued th a t  conferences in se t ting  prices sought to 
maximize the volume of t r a f f i c  earned. As a consequence, the 
conferences practiced price d iscrim ination, not however in the 
conventional form but in the manner of cross-subsidization among 
cargo movements. Cross-subsidization among cargo movements occurred 
when revenue from one movement was used to p a r t ia l ly  cover the cost 
of another movement. Furthermore, Laing (26) also argued tha t  
the foregoing ra tionale  for conference pricing implied th a t  the 
varia tion in conference ra tes  was not en tire ly  based on the value 
of the goods shipped but on a compromise between the value of goods 
and the cost of shipping them.
Empirical studies had been conducted to investigate  the de te r­
minants of l in e r  conference ra te s ,  i. e , variables th a t  would shed 
l ig h t  on the differences in l in e r  conference ra te s .  These studies 
had been used to support or disprove the aforementioned theories 
on l in e r  conference pricing . The studies had assumed th a t  
conference ra tes  for a given group of commodities had become a 
function of such variables as commodity un it value, commodity 
stowage, quantity of commodity shipped in a given period, competi­
tion along the conference route, and transport distance (27).
Conmodity un it  value was the value of the commodity per u n it  of 
weight, while stowage was the number of cubic measurement per ton 
of the commodity. Commodity stowage had generally been considered 
as a cost determinant of l in e r  ra tes  in th a t  i t  was positively  
re la ted  to cargo loading and unloading costs and was also a de te r­
minant of the amount of cargo which must share the common costs 
of vessel operations. Spec if ica lly , commodity density or the 
reciprocal of the commodity stowage determined the extent to which 
the weight and cubic hauling capacity of a ship might be u t i l iz e d  
(28).
Shipowners and operators must f i r s t  and foremost be considered as 
se lling  space and, therefore , the stowage fa c to r ,  which would be 
the space occupied in the vessel by a p a r t icu la r  commodity, must 
be one of the main factors when estab lish ing  a f re ig h t  ra te .  
Naturally, stowage fac to r  had been discussed here in a more general 
way, as i t  would be completely impossible in f re ig h t- ra te  making 
to take into account a l l  those odd pieces which owing to th e i r  
shape and form perhaps required a higher stowage fac to r  than 
normal goods. For odd pieces with the unusual shape and form, 
certa in  other rules came in when one discussed fre ig h t  ra tes  in 
l in e r  t r a f f i c .
Based on 1968 data, Heaver (29) concluded th a t  the most important 
determinant of the varia tion  in l in e r  conference ra tes  between 
the Pacific Coast of North America and Japan and Australia was 
commodity stowage. Commodity value and to ta l  value of commodities
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transported were also found to be s ign if ican t  determinants.
Based on 1969 and 1970 data ,  Deakin (30) concluded tha t  for  
the Far Eastern Freight Conference and the United Kingdom- 
Austral ia Conference, commodity value factors  generally accounted 
for  two-thirds of the explanation for  the variation in conference 
ra tes  and cost-based factors accounted for  the remaining one- 
th i rd .  Using 1969 butward-bound Canadian l in e r  Cargo data ,
Bryan (31) concluded tha t  commodity stowage and unit  value were 
s ign i f ican t  determinants of the variation in l ine r  r a te s .  Also, 
according to Bryan (32), distance was not a s ign i f ican t  de te r ­
minant of the variation in l in e r  ra tes ;  furthermore, there were 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ign i f ican t  differences among the ra tes  of various 
l in e r  conferences in terms of th e i r  response to varia t ions in 
distance,  stowage, quantity of commodities shipped, and the 
number of competitors on the l in e r  route. Based on data perta in­
ing to l in e r  trade to and from Thailand, Singapore, and I s ra e l ,  
Shneerson (33) concluded tha t  commodity stowage and un i t  value 
were s ign if ican t  determinants of the variation in the l in e r  ra te s ,  
with commodity stowage being the re la t ive ly  more important 
determinant.
The resu l ts  of Shneerson's empirical studies (34) demonstrated 
tha t  demand played a role  in fixing ra tes .  Unit value of commod­
i t i e s  gave a consistent  explanation of f re igh t  ra tes  for  individual 
commodities. I t  also gave a f a i r  indicat ion of the s ta te  of 
competition over the routes.
The stowage fac tor  appeared to be an even more important explana­
tory variable for  f re igh t  ra te s .  That i t s  e f fec t  on rates  
ref lected underlying costs had not been established.  Rather, 
there appeared to be a misconception of costs and a cer ta in  degree 
of a rb i t ra r iness  in the use of the stowage fac tor  for  f ixing ra te s .  
This s i tua t ion  had been demonstrated by the resu l ts  of the 
comparative route study.
I t  had also been supported by the application of the so-called 
"freight  ton" thinking, the "fre ight ton" (or the "revenue ton")
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being the un it  in which cargo was measured, mostly fo r the 
purpose of applying f re ig h t  ra te s .  Accordingly, high density 
cargo was usually quoted on a'."W" basis'dnd iTow idebsity.'.cargo on 
an "M" basis . A group of in-between cargoes moved on a "W/M" 
basis - whichever gave the higher revenue.
Two rela ted  aspects of " fre igh t ton" thinking would reveal 
in e ff ic ien c ies .  F i r s t ly ,  for the purpose of fixing r a te s ,  the 
consensus appeared to be th a t  commodities with a stowage fac to r 
grea ter  than 1 should pay according to the volume they occupied 
per un it weight. On the other hand, high density cargo, i . e . ,  
commodities with a stowage fac to r less  than 1, did not incur 
"volume costs" . They paid according to th e i r  weight, i r r e ­
spective of the volume they occupied within th is  range. But th is  
method of charging did not r e f le c t  the opportunity costs of 
commodities carr ied . I f  measurement was the binding constra in t 
of the trade , a l l  commodities, including those with a stowage 
fac to r  less than 1, should be charged according to the stowage 
fac to r .  Clearly, the opportunity cost of a conmodity with a 
stowage fac to r  of one ha lf  was higher than the opportunity cost 
of a commodity with a stowage fac to r  equal to one-quarter.
Another manifestion of th is  misconception was the use of 
" fre igh t tons" in measuring the volume of trade . Accounting 
practice measured the to ta l  tonnage carried  by adding weight tons 
(when the stowage fac to r was less than 1) to measurement tons 
(when i t  was greater than 1). This practice  tended to overstate 
the actual tonnage. Again, i f  volume was the binding co n s tra in t,  
quan tit ies  with a stowage fac to r less  than 1 should also be 
measured by measurement tons and should be given a "weight" less 
than 1.
Given th a t  the foregoing studies concluded th a t  the commodity 
stowage and un it value were determinants of l in e r  conference 
ra te s ,  they supported Laing's (35) ra tionale  fo r  conference 
pricing , namely, th a t  in se tting  prices l in e r  conferences sought 
to maximize the volume of t r a f f i c  carried  with the outcome being 
price discrimination in the form of cross-subsidization of cargo 
movements.
The existence of cross-subsidization in l in e r  ra tes  was also 
supported by Jansson (36) in a comparison of the ra tes  and costs 
of l in e r  cargo from U..S Pacific coast ports to Japan for the year 
1964. Furthermore, based upon imported commodities from the 
in 1972 along with trade routes involving the United States North 
A tlantic  Conference and the Gulf Mediterranean Ports Conference, 
Jansson and Shneerson (37) compared ra tes  and the costs of l in e r  
cargo and concluded tha t  l in e r  f re ig h t  ra tes  were characterized 
by cross-subsidization.
Stowage Factor Based Freight Rate
In the determination of the stowage fac to r based fre ig h t  ra te  
(SFBFR), two equations had to be s a t is f ie d ,  namely:-
(a) - f  ■= fre ig h t Wfre ig h t M
where:
M = Cubic meter bale capacity of the ship.




Freight W = Cost per ton weight, and 
Freight M = Cost per ton measurement
Freight Revenue = Total Cost of the Voyage
The ra t io  of the cubic capacity to the deadweight capacity of a 
vessel should be inversely re la ted  to the ra t io  of the f re igh t  
ra te  per ton weight to the fre igh t ra te  per ton measurement.
In determining f re igh t ra te s ,  using th is  method, the to ta l voyage 
cost must be covered by the revenue obtainable on a break-even 
point of cargo carrying capacity.
Even in the case of a llocating  transport cost to heterogeneous 
cargoes, the SFBFR appeared to be the most equitable in the 
apportionment of costs and a t  the same time came out, using simple
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computations, with a moderate level of f re ig h t  ra tes  based on 
costs (38).
I t s  s truc tu re  was much simpler since there was no need to c la ss ify  
commodities;, a lso , there was no need to have d if fe ren t  ra tes by 
commodity c la ss ,  provided the cargoes did not require special 
handling.
The shipowner or operator was assured of a reasonable return for 
serv ices, regardless of which cargo transported. There would be 
no discrimination in transporting high-value goods; hence, any 
shipper was ensured th a t  products would be transported.
Owners and operators of containerized and specialized types of 
vessels could likewise apply th is  method in determining fre igh t  
ra te s .
The SFBFR could also serve as a basis for the level of voyage 
ra tes  (39). In the application of the SFBFR method, the present 
level of f re ig h t  ra tes  and the ra te  increases which had been 
passed on through the years would have to be re -s tru c tu red , as the 
maximum benefits of th is  method could only be derived by "wiping 
the s la te  clean and s ta r t in g  afresh" (40).
Because of the cross-subsidization of f re ig h t  ra tes  in the past 
between low-value and high-value cargoes, some of the current level 
of f re igh t ra tes  might turn out to be too high, while others might 
come out to be too low in comparison with newly determined stowage 
fac to r  based f re igh t  ra tes  (41).
The SFBFR method must, therefo re , be applied gradually so th a t  
sudden increases or decreases in ra tes  would be minimized and ra tes  
fo r essentia l commodities would not increase abruptly.
This method of computing fre ig h t  ra te  based on d iffering  stowage 
factors of commodities might be universally  applied in the dry 
cargo f re ig h t  market and could be p a rt icu la rly  useful in the l in e r
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f re ig h t  market where numerous commodities of varying types and 
in d if fe ren t  quantities  must be shipped regularly . Since the 
f l e e t  operated by a l in e r  company could comprise ships of d i f f e r ­
ent types and sizes not to mention th e ir  condition re flec ting  
varying operating cos ts ,  a mean se t of f re ig h t  ra tes  might be 
determined on the basis of the pa rticu la rs  of the representative 
l in e r  ship having a cubic to deadweight cargo-carrying capacity 
r a t io  o f , say, U cubic meters per ton weight. A lterna tive ly , 
an average might be taken of the d iffe ren t  pa rt icu la rs  of each 
ship comprising the f l e e t  serving a specific  route such tha t  
the f re ig h t  ra tes quoted by the l in e r  shipping company from one 
scheduled sa i ling  to another would not vary accordingly.
Liner Conference Surcharges
In recent years, two important forms of l in e r  surcharges had been 
applied, namely: the Bunker Adjustment Factor (BAF) and the
Currency Adjustment Factor (CAF). The BAF was a surcharge used 
by l in e r  shipping conferences to compensate member lines  for 
increases in bunker costs (42). Many conferences, including the 
Conference of In ter-Is land  Shipowners and Operators (CISO) in the 
Philippines, applied the BAF in the wake of the large increases 
in the price of oil in 1973 and in l a t e r  years.
Formulas Used to Calculate BAF
A survey conducted by the Committee on Shipping, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), showed th a t  generally 
conferences used some established formula to ca lcu la te  BAF, a l ­
though one conference s ta ted  th a t  no special formula had been 
la id  down fo r  the BAF except th a t  the average costs of bunker 
were taken into consideration. The origins of BAF formulas had 
not been very c lea r ;  they seemed to have been developed by some 
major conferences and then spread to other trades. They were not 
based on a formal agreement, fo r  example, between Council of 
European and Japanese Shipowners' Association (CENSA) and some 
group of shippers' councils , as in the case of CAF. The responses
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indicated th a t  the two main formulas are in use. The f i r s t  
formula (Formula I ) ,  which was the more widely used, calculated 
a percentage change in bunker prices weighted by a bunker in c i­
dence fac to r .  Formula I was also used by the MARINA but was known 
as the ra t io  method. This weighted percentage change was the BAF 
applied to the base fre ig h t  ra te .  This formula had several 
variants which were distinguished by the procedure used for 
averaging price changes of individual member lines to obtain 
conference-wide price changes. The second formula (Formula II) 
used by a re la t iv e ly  small number of conferences - mainly those 
regulated by the United States Federal Maritime Commission - 
calculated the sum of do llars  (or some other f re ig h t currency) 
per ton required to o ffse t  a change in a u n it  bunker p rice , and 
a f l a t  sum of do llars  per ton was applied regardless of the base 
f re ig h t  ra te  (43).
Formula I was e ssen tia lly  based on the princip le  used by the 
conferences to calculate  what was termed a warranted increase in 
the base f re igh t ra te  or the general ra te  increase (GRI).
The calculation of the GRI, which included the BAF, involved the 
estimation of weighted percentage changes in the various cost 
items contained in the l in e s '  voyage costings. These percentage 
changes were then added up to obtain an overall percentage cost 






Values of cost items a t  a base period 
Values of cost items a t  a current period 
Percentage change in the costs between the 
base and current periods 
Weighting fac to rs  r individual cost items 
expressed as percentages of to ta l  voyage cost 
Weighted percentage cost changes
Then
C(%) = i J l A  X 100 and E {%) =
A 100
According to Formula I I ,  BAF was calculated as a f l a t  per ton 
sum regardless of the base f re igh t r a te .  I t  estimated the sum 
of do llars  per ton required to o ffse t  a un it  change in bunker 
price.
The individual member l ines  submitted data on various items 
which when averaged for the whole conference were used in the 
following way:-
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Let V = Number of voyage days during a selected 
previous period, say, the l a s t  6 months
F = • Fuel consumption (tons of fuel per voyage 
day) during a selected previous period of 
time
Co = Base period price per ton of fuel consumed
Cl = Current period price per ton of fuel consumed
To = V X F X Co = Total fuel cost per voyage 
a t  base period price
T1 = V X F X C1 = Total fuel cost per voyage 
a t  current period price
D = T1 - To = The change in fuel cost per 
voyage between the base and 
the current periods
W = Payable tons of cargo per voyage during a 
selected period of time
Therefore, E = D/W = Additional cost of fuel per
ton of cargo per voyage in
Guidelines
dollars  = bunker surcharge 
(in do lla rs  per ton weight or 
measurement as f re igh ted ).
As mentioned e a r l i e r ,  BAFs and CAFs being used in l in e r  trades 
were intended to compensate shipping lines  fo r  changes in costs 
which arose from changes in bunker prices and changes in currency 
exchange ra te s ,  respectively .
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They distinguished themselves from changes in the general 
f re ig h t  ra te  because of th e i r  v o la t i l i ty  and the ease with 
which they could be changed by the conferences.
The BAFs and CAFs were an important fac to r  on the level of the 
overall cost of transport and hence on p r ices , especially  those 
of primary commodities. This had a s ig n if ican t  e ffe c t  on the 
market demand for these commodities and the net earnings of 
producers.
Various aspects of the methods and formulas used to calculate  
and to apply BAF and CAF posed important problems. While in the 
past i t  had been e ssen t ia l ly  the conferences which determined 
the formulas and methods and th e i r  app lica tion , governmental and 
inter-governmental policy measures h a d a ro le to  play in influencing 
the levels o f , and changes, in f re ig h t  ra te s .  Policy guidelines 
could be made a useful contribution to the improvement of the 
present methods.
Standardization of BAF/CAF Methods and Formulas
There had been a lack of uniformity in the BAF and CAF formulas 
and methods currently  in use. This must be considered a source of 
confusion to shippers who might have to deal with many conferences. 
Such a s itua tion  would lead to inequity in the levels of BAFs and 
CAFs being applied by d if fe ren t  conferences. To minimize these 
problems, various elements of the methods should be standardized 
to the extent possible to make them uniform. In p a r t ic u la r ,  
standardization regarding the following elements would appear 
feasib le  and should be promoted:-
( i )  Weighting fac tors for both BAF and CAF;'
( i i )  The sizes of samples of bunker prices and exchange 
ra tes  used for monitoring the changes in the bunker 
prices and exchange rates*,'
( i i i )  Trigger points;
(iv) The length of review period;
(v) The order or sequence of applying the BAF, CAF, and 
other surcharges.
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I t  would be e s se n t ia l ,  therefore , th a t : -
(a) "The dates fo r weighting factors fo r BAF and CAF 
should be uniform for a ll  conferences and they should 
be updated regularly  as deemed necessary and 
appropriate;
(b) The samples of bunker prices and exchange ra tes  
used to monitor changes in those variables should 
be su ff ic ie n tly  large to overcome the problems 
which would a r ise  from the use of samples considered 
too small;
(c) The t r ig g e r  points should be established a t  such 
levels as to ensure tha t  s ig n if ican t  variations
in bunker prices and exchange ra tes  had been captured 
without, however, causing too frequent changes in 
f re ig h t  ra te s .
(d) The order of applying the BAF and CAF should be 
ra tionalized  and standardized. In doing so conferences 
should consult shippers a t  both ends of the trade" (44).
I t  has been argued by some conferences th a t  standardization of 
methods was not feas ib le  because of differences in the commercial 
ch a rac te r is t ic s  and needs of the various trades. Also, some of 
the smaller conferences might not have the resources to afford the 
co llec tion  of extensive data and to  apply sophisticated  methods 
of ca lcu lation . However, in the responses to the UNCTAD 
Questionnaire, "there was no evidence to indicate  any re la t io n ­
ship between methods used, on the one hand, and trade routes or 
the sizes of conferences, on the other hand. The methods used 
thus appeared to be independent of the commercial c h a rac te r is t ic s  
of the trades or the sizes of the conferences" (45).
Improvement in Shipper/Shipowner Consultations
In many cases the periodic changes in BAF and CAF were effected 
without any formal consultations between shippers and shipowners. 
Moreover, in many trades , shippers had no information on how the 
surcharges were calculated . Even in cases where the methods
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had been explained and discussed, the views and objections of 
shippers concerning the methodology used had usually not been 
accepted by the conferences.
In many cases, conferences consulted only with shippers a t  one 
end of the trade and the views and in te res ts  of shippers a t  the 
other end were not taken into account. Thus, for  example, the 
formulas and methods for  CAP contained in the ESC/CENSA Joint  
Recommendation were used in trades outside Western Europe where 
the shippers were not involved in the formulation of the Join t  
Recommendation. Another important example would be the jo in t  
e f fo r t  by ESC and CENSA to develop a standard format of the order 
or sequence of applying the BAF, CAP, and other surcharges; 
here, too, shippers outside the ESC were not involved and yet the 
resul t ing format was expected to be used in th e i r  t rades.
Even assuming that  there was agreement on the BAF/CAF formulas 
there would s t i l l  be the question of the ver i f ica t ion  of the input 
data to which the formulas were applied. On th is  question, the 
conferences ins is ted  tha t  the accounts of the individual member 
l ines  were confidential commercial information and could not be 
made avai lable to outsiders .  They maintained tha t  the summaries 
given to the independent accountants were su f f ic ien t  basis on 
which to base the calculat ions.  The shippers found th e i r  lack of 
a b i l i ty  to verify the input data as the key weakness of the 
existing BAF/CAF systems. The use of independent accountants did 
not appear to solve the issue since the accountants re l ied  on 
data supplied by the individual l ines  and were not in a position 
to verify th e i r  accuracy. Moreover, published data on exchange 
rates  and bunker prices were not su f f ic ien t  in themselves in 
verifying the calculat ions since the data on which the weighting 
factors were calculated were avai lable only to the shipping l ines .
To overcome these problems i t  was essentia l  t h a t : -
(a) Shippers should be allowed to play a greater  role  in 
the process of determining the calculation and
applicat ion of the surcharges through improved shipper/ 
shipowner consulta tions. In th is  regard, there 
should be greater transparency in the methods, 
formulas and input used in the ca lculat ions.  The 
consultation process should respect existing 
international agreements pa r t icu la r ly  Art icles 16 
and 17 of the Convention on a Code of Conduct for  
Liner Conferences, which had now come into force.
Art icle  16 of the Code provided tha t  before any 
surcharges were imposed, notice should be given 
and consultation held upon request.  There was 
provision for  surcharges to be imposed without prior  
consulta tion, but in such cases consultation should 
be held as soon as possible the rea f te r .  I f  there 
was lack of agreement on the question of a surcharge 
between the part ies  concerned, the relevant  pro­
visions for settlement of disputes provided in. the 
Code should prevail.
Art icle  17 provided tha t  currency adjustment factors 
should be subject to notice and consultation. The 
consultation should be on the applica t ion,  size and 
date of implementation (46).
(b) In conducting consulta tions, the views of shippers a t  
both ends of the trade should be taken into account 
and
(c) Formulas and methods in use should be subjected to 
reviews to be jo in t ly  carried out by conferences and 
shippers a t  both ends of the trade to ensure th e i r  
compatibility with changing s i tua t ions  and also th e i r  
acceptabi l i ty  to shippers a t  both ends of the t rade.  
Reviews should also be carried out to .assess the 
necessity of continuation of given surcharges or to 
establish some c r i t e r i a  to be used in arr iving a t  a 
decision on the continuation or discontinuation of 
the surcharges.
Equitable Sharing of Risks between Shippers and Shipowners
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Under existing BAF and CAF systems, the surcharges were passed 
on wholly to shippers. Shippers had argued tha t  unexpected 
changes in bunker prices and exchange rates  were commercial 
r isks  which ought to be shared by both shippers and ship­
owners. They f e l t  tha t  to pass on the fu l l  burden of the added 
costs  to them was inequitable since they could not follow su i t  
by passing on the surcharges to consumers without causing harm 
to the markets for  the commodities concerned. I t  had also been 
observed tha t  some degree of r isk  sharing existed in the case 
of the general f re igh t  r a te ,  in p a r t icu la r ,  through the in t ro ­
duction of ra te  freeze periods and also because of cancel la t ions ,  
reductions, or postponements of proposed ra te  increases. This 
development rarely applied to BAFs and CAFs. There was, there-, 
fore ,  a c lear  inconsistency whereby r isk  sharing was applied 
to the general rate  but not to BAF and CAF.
Furthermore, i t  could be argued tha t  a system of fu l l  automatic 
recovery or compensation such as tha t  applicable to BAF and CAF 
tended to reduce the incentives of shipping l ines  to increase 
t h e i r  eff ic iency in bunker consumption (in the case of BAF) and 
to reduce th e i r  exposure to currency exchanges (in the case of 
CAF). Thus, although shipping l ines would normally make e ffo r ts  
to increase eff iciency in fuel consumption and to reduce 
exposure to currency exchanges, these e f fo r t s  would probably be 
increased i f  the l ines were not assured of an automatic recovery 
of the cost increases.
I t  might, therefore ,  be more equitable , while a t  the same time 
promoting the l in e s '  incentive to increase eff iciency or to 
reduce exposure to currency exchanges, to apportion the com­
puted CAFs and BAFs on some agreed bas is ,  such as 50/50. This 
objective could also be achieved by various other means, such 
as raising the t r igger  points , extending periods of notice prior
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to implementing new levels of surcharges or applying surcharge 
freezing periods.
A number of conferences had stated that  the shipping l ines 
were already absorbing the BAFs and CAFs through various types 
of discounts to shippers. They also pointed out tha t  i f  the 
principle of sharing was introduced in the BAFs and CAFs th is  
would remove the principle  of no gain/no loss on which the 
present BAF and CAF systems had been based. I f  the shipping 
l ines absorbed some of the costs as indicated, i t  would 
improve consultations with shippers i f  such absorption was 
quantified and c lear ly  explained to shippers when announcing 
changes in the levels  of the surcharges. Furthermore, while 
shippers and shipowners could agree to base BAF and CAF calcu­
lat ions on the principle of no gain/no loss ,  such would not 
preclude the absorption of shipping l ines of part  of the 
computed surcharges (47).
Incorporation of the Surcharges into the Basic Rate
There was much disagreement on the appropriateness of 
incorporating BAF and CAF into the base f re igh t  ra te .  Many 
conferences did not incorporate the surcharges, and a number 
of conferences had confirmed that  non-incorporation did not 
enta il  any losses to the shipping l ines .  Therefore, i t  was 
evident tha t  incorporation was not a commercial necessity and 
i t  was suggested tha t  i t  would be effected only when there 
was a mutual agreement between the conferences and the shippers 
concerned.
Other Elements for  Consideration
(i)  Adjustments for  Excess Gains or Losses from BAF
Due to possible changes in cargo volumes, the calcu­
lat ion of BAF using the two formulas currently  in 
use might generate revenues which would be greater  or 
less than the additional bunker costs on which the
BAF had been calculated,  and the gains and losses 
might not cancel out in the aggregate or in the 
long run. I t  would, therefore ,  be essentia l  for 
conferences to assess the size of the discrepancy 
between intended and actual BAF revenues and to 
compensate the l ines  or the shippers for  assessed 
excess gains or losses .  Such compensation could 
be achieved by appropriately adjusting the BAF 
during the subsequent periodic review.
( i i ) Introduction of Different Scales fo r  BAF when 
Applied on a Flat  Per Ton Basis
BAF Formula II imposed an excessive burden on low- 
valued/low-rated cargoes when the BAF levels were 
increasing. Conferences could consider se t t ing  
the BAF a t  d i f fe ren t  scales or leve ls ,  giving due 
consideration to the re la t ive  a b i l i t y  of d i f fe ren t  
cargoes to bear the surcharge.
( i i i )  Co-operation between Shippers' Organizations
Shippers' organizations would need to be su f f ic ien t ly  
strong and well informed to be e ffect ive  in th e i r  
consultations with shipowners or conferences on 
matters of surcharges and f re igh t  ra te s .  Regional 
and sub-regional co-operation between shippers'  
organizations could offer  an important means of 
strengthening th e i r  bargaining power and improving 
th e i r  research capabil i ty  in developing sound ship­
ping data and information. Such co-operation could 
be co-ordinated under appropriate programs of the 
United Nations regional commissions and/or other 





Conferences should monitor bunker prices a t  established 
in te rva ls .  The frequency of BAF reviews should range from 
weekly in tervals  to quarterly in te rva ls ,  with monthly intervals  
being the most commonly used. As a r e su l t  of these regular  
reviews, i f  the BAF calculat ions arr ived a t  figures which 
would exceed established t r igger  points ,  new levels  of BAF 
should be introduced. The t r igge r  points should be the mini­
mum sizes of changes in the level of the calculated BAF which 
needed to be arrived a t  in order to revise the exis ting level 
to a new one.
A large number of conferences had conducted two types of 
reviews - a regular review and a radical review. Trigger points 
for  the radical review were usually higher than those for  the 
regular review. Also the radical review period was shorter  
than the regular one - the former being a more or less continu­
ous process.
In some conferences, the d is t inc t ion  between radical and 
regular reviews appeared only limited to the date of implement­
ation of a new level of BAF. In such cases the conference 
would conduct only one review, say, a monthly one, but would use 
an e a r l i e r  or l a t e r  date of implementation depending on whether, 
respectively , a radical or regular t r igger  point had been 
reached a t  the time of the BAF calculat ions .
Not a l l  conferences would use the radical review system, and 
generally, the question of which frequency of review to use 
would become quite important since i t  could influence the levels 
of BAF actual ly  implemented. Generally, changes in bunker 
prices appeared to be quite  random and, on the whole, conferences 
did not seem to agree on the factors which should be the basis
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for  choosing the review period. In the survey, some conferences 
explained th a t  the choice of the review period correspond to the 
observed pattern of movements in bunker prices;  other conferences 
explained tha t  the frequency was based on the adequacy of period 
of notice on BAF given to shippers. However, the majority of 
conferences could not provide an explanation for  th e i r  choice, 
except to s ta te  tha t  the frequency of review was agreed upon with 
shippers'  organization.
The need to capture a l l  s ign if ican t  bunker price changes had to 
be balanced against  the cost of continuous monitoring of prices 
and the need to maintain f re igh t  rate  s t a b i l i t y .  The. cost  of 
monitoring changes in bunker prices might appear to be quite 
negligible  since the information could readily  be available from 
the oil markets and from conference member l ine s .  As regards 
ra te  s t a b i l i t y ,  too frequent changes could be avoided by 
establishing su f f ic ien t ly  high t r igge r  points.
Another important aspect of the review procedure would re la te  to 
the sizes of the samples of bunker prices used in the calculat ions.  
I t  would show tha t  some conferences used bunker prices pre­
vailing on a single day in the review period, while others used 
prices paid during a voyage leg ,  while s t i l l  others used average 
prices paid over a one-month period or a three-month period.
Given a high v o l a t i l i t y  of bunker prices in recent years, larger  
price samples could c lear ly  represent prices prevailing over a 
review period b e t te r  than would smaller price samples.
Implementation Procedures (BAF)
The Trigger Points
As mentioned e a r l i e r ,  the t r igge r  points should be the minimum 
sizes of changes in the BAF which needed to be reached in order 
for  an existing level of BAF to be revised. These points must be 
determined outside the operative BAF formulas. Many of the 
conferences in the survey explained that  the t r igge r  points were 
the resu l t  of negotiations with shippers'  organizations.
50
In selecting the points ,  the main consideration appeared to be 
s t a b i l i t y  of f re igh t  ra te s .  The points had been set  a t  levels 
which would eliminate rate  in s t a b i l i ty  tha t  would have occurred 
i f  a l l  observable bunker price changes were to r e su l t  in the 
applicat ion of new BAFs.
At the same time,however, the levels should be se t  su f f ic ien t ly  
low to ensure tha t  the l ines recovered adequately the additional 
bunker costs .
Effective Dates of BAF Implementation
Once i t  had been determined tha t  a new level of BAF was to be 
applied,  there must be a waiting period before the new level 
actual ly  came into force.  The regular and radical BAFs should 
have d i f fe ren t  waiting periods. Generally, waiting periods 
should range from a few days to one month for  regular reviews and 
from a few days to  around 20 days for  radical reviews. In the 
survey, many conferences explained tha t  the waiting period 
between the calculat ion of the BAF and actual implementation was 
intended to give su f f ic ien t  notice to shippers. One conference 
stated tha t  the waiting time was also needed to give adequate 
time to the conference l ines to amend th e i r  computer programs and 
documentary procedures.
Application for  BAF to the Base Freight Rate and to Other Surcharges
Since under Formula I ,  the BAF was applied to the base f re igh t  
r a t e ,  i t  had been common practice to adjus t  the level of BAF 
following any changes in the base f re igh t  r a te .  The BAF must be 
adjusted in proportion to the change in the base ra te  so tha t  the 
revenue derived from the BAF remained unchanged. I f ,  fo r  example, 
in an i n i t i a l  s i tuat ion  the base f re igh t  was 100 and the BAF was 
25 percent, the calculated f re igh t  ra te  would be 125.
If  the base f re igh t  ra te  was now assumed to increase by 15 percent,  
the adjusted calculated f re igh t  rate  would be 140.
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The exact time a t  which the BAF adjustment was made should vary. 
Some conferences indicated th a t  they made the adjustment a t  the 
time of calculating the BAF. Thus, the new computed BAF would 
be adjusted for any changes in the base ra te  which might have 
occurred since the l a s t  change in the BAF. Other conferences 
made the adjustment to the existing BAF a t  the time of change in 
the base f re ig h t ra te ,  while yet others indicated th a t  the 
adjustments took place both during BAF reviews and during reviews 
of the base ra te .
The timing of the BAF adjustment to correct fo r changes in the 
base ra te  should be important in cases where the adjustment would 
occur only during the BAF review and especially  where the in te r ­
vals between the reviews would be long. In such cases any changes 
in the base f re ig h t  ra te  taking place in between BAF reviews might 
lead to an over- or under-charge. However, the extent of th is  
problem would depend on the re la t iv e  time in te rvals  between the 
changes in the base fre ig h t  ra te  and the BAF reviews.
As fa r  as the calculation of the increase in the base f re ig h t ra te  
was concerned, i t  would be essentia l th a t  where the BAF was being 
applied, changes in bunker costs should not be included in the 
costing exercise fo r determirihgthe warranted change in the base 
ra te .
With regard to the re la tionsh ip  between the BAF and other su r­
charges, conferences generally applied the BAF to the base ra te  
net of other surcharges although i t  had been common practice  in 
some conferences to charge BAF on various additionals  such as 
heavy l i f t  and long lengths.
I t  would appear evident th a t  each format was l ik e ly  to produce 
d iffe ren t  re s u l ts .  There must therefore be a need for a thorough 
examination of th is  problem so th a t  a uniform and rational format 
fo r  f re igh t calculation could be formulated (49).
Incorporation of BAF into the Base Freight Rate
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Those conferences which advocated the principle  of incorpor­
ation argued tha t  the r i s e  in bunker prices was an establ ished, 
i r revers ib le  fac t  and therefore the incorporation of the BAF 
into the base f re igh t  ra te  was a ref lect ion  of a t ru e ,  permanent 
s h i f t  in the l in e s '  costs .
However, the opponents of incorporation pointed out tha t  in 
principle the BAF was a temporary device intended to o ffse t  
unexpected short-term changes in bunker prices .  For th is  reason, 
i t  should not be mixed with permanent changes in costs which had 
been deal t  with when reviewing the base f re igh t  ra te .  I t  
appeared th a t ,  apart  from the issue of pr incip le ,  the problem 
related to doubts about the accuracy of the BAF, especially in 
view of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  in verifying the underlying input data. 
Thus, they f e l t  tha t  incorporation might introduce permanent 
errors in the base f re igh t  ra te  and hence the to ta l  f re igh t  ra te .
Comparative BAF Levels in Opposite Directions of the Same Trade
In most l in e r  trades there had been two separate conferences 
operating in opposite directions of the same trade route. 
Generally, d i f fe ren t  levels of BAF applied in the opposite d i rec ­
t ions .  In part  th is  arose from differences in the composition of 
the member l ines operating in the two directions - a fac tor  which 
would presumably a f fec t  the weighting factors used in calculating 
the BAFs in each of the two conferences. However, there were 
important exceptions to th is  s i tua t ion .  For example, in the 
Far Eastern Freight Conference, the same BAF applied to both eas t -  
bound and west-bound trade areas .
Consultation between Shippers and Conferences Regarding BAF
There had been contrasting views between conferences and 
shippers'  organizations regarding the extent to which the con­
sul ta t ions played a part  in the arrangements for  BAF and the
53
degree of satisfaction with the overall BAF system. Generally, 
conferences were satisfied with the BAF system - a t least in 
the absence of a better, proven, alternative system. In the 
survey, some conferences indicated that they discussed or 
explained the methods used to the shippers. Some conferences also 
pointed out that such elements.as trigger points, the length of 
period of notice to shippers, and the effective dates of imple­
mentation were the result of active negotiations between the 
conferences and shippers' organizations. Many of the conferences 
f e l t  that, all in a l l ,  the BAF system was achieving its  
objectives.
The views of shippers' organizations had generally been quite 
different from those of the conferences, although the situation 
did vary somewhat between different shippers' organizations.
For this purpose the situation could be examined in terms of 
three broad groups of shippers' organizations: (i) those
shippers or shippers' organization where a high degree of con­
sultation with conferences on BAF occurred; ( i i )  shippers in 
the United States and Brazilian trades, where matters relating to 
BAF and freight rates were generally regulated by governmental 
agencies; and ( i i i )  shippers in trades where consultations on 
BAF had been least satisfactory (50).
Examples of shippers' organizations under the f i r s t  category would 
include the European Shippers' Council (ESC) and the Australian 
Shippers' Council. The ESC, as an umbrella organization for 
national shippers' councils in Western Europe, has pointed out 
that, except for a few cases, the conferences were always ready to 
explain and clarify their methods and formulas for calculating BAF.
However, the Council had conceded that i t  lacked the means to 
verify the accuracy of the input data furnished by the conference 
member lines. Furthermore, the Council has stated that i ts  request 
to conferences for higher trigger points and for an absorption by 
conferences for a portion of the higher bunker costs had not 
succeeded.
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A number of individual national shippers' councils which are 
members of the ESC, such as those of Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and the Netherlands had been even more c ritica l of the BAF 
system. They stated that consultations on BAF had not been 
satisfactory and that the conferences were generally unrespons­
ive to arguments presented by shippers concerning various aspects 
of BAF. The United Kingdom Shippers' Council stated that 
shippers f e l t  that under certain circumstances BAF was used to 
increase shipowners' revenue rather than to meet the increased 
cost of fu e l.
The Australian Shippers Council indicated that i t  was activdTy 
involved in the design'of the formulas and methods for the 
calculation and application of BAF, but had no means of verify­
ing the input data used by the conferences.
Shippers in the United States and Brazilian trades had been 
faced with a situation in which matters relating to BAF were 
regulated by governmental agencies - the United States Federal 
Maritime Commission (FMC) and the National Superintendency of 
the Merchant Marine (SUNAMAM), respectively. In most 
United States trades BAF calculations had been based on BAF 
Formula II described ea rlie r , which was the formula suggested 
and approved by the FMC. Because of the United States an ti­
tru st laws there had been no shippers' councils in that country. 
Moreover, conferences operating in the United States trades 
were only required to f i le  relevant information on surcharges 
with the FMC and were not en titled  to conduct consultations with 
any shippers' organizations. As a resu lt, no shippers' 
organizations could conduct any effective consultations on BAF 
with conferences operating in the United States trades. In the 
Brazilian case, the SUNAMAM its e lf  carried out the BAF calcula­
tions and established all the arrangements for i ts  application. 
According to information provided by the Brazilian Society for 
the Administration for Freight Conferences, the formulas used 
by the SUNAMAM were not known to the conferences.
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Regarding the situation in the remaining conference trades, 
including many of those in Africa and Asia, many shippers' 
organizations which responded to the questionnaire had not 
been given information about the methods used and no 
effective consultations had been conducted. In their replies 
to the UNCTAD questionnaire, some shippers' organizations 
mentioned that the BAF methods in use were agreed between 
the ESC and CENSA without involving shippers at the other 




The frequency of reviews would range from weekly, with monthly 
reviews being the most predominant. Also, there had been a 
distinction between regular and radical reviews^ The frequency 
of the regular reviews must be known, while the radical reviews 
should be based on daily monitoring of exchange rates and, if  
there was a change of four percent (or other radical trigger 
point) or more over a period of three or four consecutive bank 
working days, a new CAP should be introduced.
Like bunker prices, currency exchange rates tended to change at 
random. Furthermore, the cost of monitoring exchange rates was 
insignificant since the relevant data would be readily available 
from financial or banking institutions. Consequently, highly 
frequent CAP reviews (say fortnightly) could be feasible, and 
to avoid too frequent fluctuations in rates, sufficiently high 
trigger points must be established.
The size of the sample of exchange rates on which the CAP cal­
culations should be based would vary widely between conferences. 
I t  would range from exchange rates monitored on a single day to 
an average of exchange rates monitored over a two-week period. 
These differences would not appear to have any regional or 
trade route patterns. Because of possible significant variations 
in exchange rates over short periods of time, larger samples of 
exchange rates would be more representative and would minimize 
bias in the calculations as compared to exchange rates taken, 
for example, on one or a few days. This problem had hot been 
solved by radical reviews to the extent that the exchange rate 





As in the case of BAF, proper trigger points for CAF should be 
set a t levels which would eliminate rate in stab ility .
Effective Dates of CAF Implementation
The ESC/CENSA Joint Recommendation suggested that the in tro­
duction of CAF should be delayed by eight calendar days.from and 
including the date of effective change in the exchange rates.
The effective dates of implementation for regular and radical 
CAFs must be specified.
In the survey, the majority of conferences mentioned the ade­
quacy of time of notice to shippers as the main factor in setting 
the effective dates of implementation. In a few conferences, 
the dates were chosen to allow negotiations with shippers' 
organizations. A few other conferences argued that an immediate 
reduction in CAF following a review was necessary to prevent 
shippers from withholding their cargo until the reduced CAF 
became effective.
Application of CAF to the Base Rate and to Other Surcharges
According to the conferences surveyed, a change in the base 
freight rate did not lead to an automatic adjustment in the CAF. 
However, some conferences indicated that the CAF could be 
adjusted i f  the whole or part of i t  was incorporated into the 
base freight rate . Other conferences pointed out that each time 
there was a change in the base freight ra te , the CAF weighting 
factors were updated.
The procedure for applying the CAF to other surcharges must be 
similar to that of BAF, i . e . ,  i t  was generally applied to the 
base rates net of other surcharges although some conferences
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charged the CAF on additionals. As mentioned earlie r , the ESC 
and CENSA had been working on a standard format to lay down the 
order for applying the various surcharges.
While some conferences had incorporated the CAF into the base 
rate, the majority of them had not done so.
Consultation between Shippers and Shipowners regarding CAF
The problems concerning shipper/shipowner consultations and the 
verification of input data with regard to CAF calculation were 
generally similar to those for BAF. In the ESC/CENSA Joint 
Recommendation i t  was agreed that any difference of opinion 
between shippers and shipowners on the need for, or the appro­
priate level of, a CAF should be the subject of prompt discussion 
between shippers' councils and the conferences concerned at the 
request of either party. I t  was likewise agreed that i f  i t  
became necessary for a conference to supply evidence to shippers' 
councils, i f  requested by them, either directly or through a 
third party, such as an independent accountant, the data to be 
supplied in such a case should be a l i s t  of relevant base 
exchange rates and a l i s t  of weighting factors needed for CAF 
calculation.
The survey indicated that generally conferences were satisfied 
with the existing CAF system, which they f e l t  was achieving its  
objective. Some had stated that they explained to, or dis­
cussed with, shippers the methods and formulas used. However, 
some conferences conceded that i t  would not be easy for shippers' 
organizations to monitor accurately the calculations for CAF.
On the side of shippers, the ESC, which was a party to the 
Joint Recommendation, had pointed out that i t  had many discus­
sions with conferences concerning the implementation of the 
Recommendation and i ts  formula. The ESC noted that generally 
conferences explained the implementation of the Recommendation, 
although the Council lacked the means to check the composition
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of the basket of currencies of conferences, which played a 
decisive role in the CAP calculations. The Council also pointed 
out that the CAP system had come under strong criticism and a 
number of individual (national) shippers' councils in Europe had 
withdrawn their support from the Joint Recommendation on account 
of the considerable differences in the CAP levels caused by the 
Recommendation's differentiated CAP system.
In the UNCTAD survey, a number of shippers' organizations outside 
the ESC indicated much dissatisfaction with the fact that they 
were not consulted in the formulation of the Joint Recommendation 
and they deplored the conferences' unilateral imposition of CAP 
in their trades. They also pointed out that conferences were 
generally not prepared to hold consultations on the periodic 
changes in CAP and they normally did not supply data on currency 
weights which the conferences regarded as confidential commercial 
information.
Some shipping conferences had argued that shippers outside the 
ESC were not involved in the formulation of the Joint Recommendation 
and other agreements because a t the time these matters were discussed 
these shippers had not organized themselves into effective 
shippers' councils. While this argument might be applicable to 
the situation prevailing up to the late 1960s, i t  could no longer 
apply to the mid-1970s and onward because by then shippers in 
many countries had formed shippers' organizations. Despite these 
changes, however, shipping lines which were members of CENSA had 
continued to exclude shippers outside the ESC in fundamental 
discussions on formulas and methods for freight rates and sur­
charges. The main example of this was the discussion between 
CENSA and the ESC on the order for laying down the various sur­




A ta r i f f  based on the value of the commodity and the capacity 
of the cargo owner to pay might seem to be meritorious.
Essential low-value products could be transported at relatively 
low cost, thereby resulting in lower consumer prices. The low- 
income group of the Philippines which constituted the majority 
of the population would derive the benefits; production of 
essential low-value goods would increase which, in turn, would 
result in greater t raff ic  volume. The uti l ization rates of 
vessels would likewise improve.
Regarding what freight levels the market could bear, the ship 
operators after due negotiations with the shippers would be in 
a better position to set the rates.
In most developed maritime countries, liner rates were value- 
based and were set by liner conferences. To prevent over­
pricing, a suitable platform for the negotiation of freight 
rates was provided where both the ship operators and the shippers 
justified their position on the basis of facts and figures 
accessible to both parties. The position of each side could 
thus readily be justified (52).
The free entry of tramps and non-conference liners had also 
served to minimize, i f  not avoid, overpricing.
CHAPTER X
FREE COMPETITION
A bonsultant from the Norwegian Team involved in the Standard 
Ship Design Project commented as follows:-
"The North Sea Basin is by size comparable to the domestic 
waters of the Philippines or smaller than those of 
Indonesia. The basic difference, however, is the fact that 
the North Sea is surrounded by a number of countries, all 
with long maritime experience. Shipping operators are 
exposed to free competition, even in our domestic waters.
There is no common ta r if f  on the transport of the cargo.
The freight rates are governed by supply and demand. We 
have no one but ourselves to blame if  we lose out. I t  is a 
tough but healthy environment which creates inventiveness.
I t forces you to stay ahead.
We are not suggesting that you should open your domestic 
waters to free foreign competition, nor do we believe that 
free competition solves all the problems within the trans­
port sector, but we are convinced that i t  has been perhaps 
one of the most important aspects in the development process 
of the Norwegian shipping industry.
The other system which is widely used to regulate the size 
of the domestic f lee t is the licensing system. Many nations 
look upon this system as the only workable solution in order 
to provide adequate transport services to remote areas where 
the cargo volumes are small and distances are far.
This system further necessitates a government-approved ta r ­
i f f ,  often with an element of subsidy to ease the burden of 
transport cost to remote d is tr ic ts .
The good intention behind this policy is indisputable and to 
which we all agree. What has caught our in terest is , 
however, the influence th is policy has on the f lee t structure"
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"The result very often seems to be a chain reaction 
starting with overtonnaging, which quickly leads to insuf­
ficient profit to renew the ships and gradually an-over- 
aged f leet .
The operators will naturally keep up their struggle to 
stay in business and the only way to do so is to apply 
pressure on the government to increase the freight t a r i f f ,  
with the end result that no one benefits but a costly trans­
port system is created" (53).
While the ship operators did not apply pressure on government 
authorities, the situation described appeared partially to be 
that prevailing in the domestic shipping f lee t ,  overtonnaged 
but not exactly overaged..
The acquisition of relatively younger ships and the subsequent 
phase-out of older vessels resulted to the reduction of the 
average f lee t  age to 10 years and to partial f lee t  modernization 
with the introduction of semi- and fully-containerized ships 
and roll on-roll off vessels. The use of containerized cargo 
services was considered one of the significant achievements in 
the domestic shipping sector.
From one company operating one container ship with a 120-TEU 
capacity in 1976, container operations had increased to seven 
firms operating a combined container f lee t  of 54 ships with a 
total capacity of 4,257 TEU's. In 1984, containerized cargo 
movements accounted for around 50 percent of the total domestic 
cargo traff ic .
On deregulation, in terms of the benefits derived, there was 
no better proof of successful implementation than the airl ine 
•deregulation in the United States. According to Bailey (54), 
regulatory barriers to entry were removed within three years 
after  the passage of the Airline ^Deregulation Act. Existing 
carriers could enter routes of their choice, entry of new je t
carriers into the industry could no longer be blocked by the 
government; the apparatus of route applications and quasi- 
judicial hearings was dismantled. The management of airlines 
was given complete freedom in the re-structuring of their  route 
networks. Complete freedom of pricing now existed.
The pot ential benefits that the reformers expected had indeed 
taken place, in terms of greater efficiency, due to reduction 
of structural r ig id i t ies ,  and price reduction, due to greater 
competition and the entry of the low-cost carriers.
Overall, the gains from deregulation fully justif ied the policy. 
Consumers gained more than $3 bill ion in benefits and carriers 
enjoyed the flexibi l i ty  that they needed to better their  finan­
cial outlook.
Some lessons from .deregulation that should be highlighted would 
be:
1. During the decontrol period, the best policy was to 
forebear to intervene, to accept uncertainty, and to 
le t  the market place work.
2. Mechanisms for monitoring specific areas of concern 
could be devised when needed.
3. Fears concerning disruption of service to consumers 
were exaggerated and did not materialize.
4. Many hidden costs of regulation had revealed 
themselves.
5. The spur of competition had been effective in leading 
to a substantially'more efficient industry.
These principles could be highly useful when applied to further 
decontrol in transportation and long-distance telecommunica­
tions (55).
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The 'deregulation of airl ine fares presented a rare opportunity 
to examine the effects of an abrupt change in the market 
structure. Before 1977, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 
regulated fares and entry in domestic airline markets and 
allowed the carriers to compete only in terms of service quality. 
Koran (56) examined the effect of the de facto 'deregulation 
of airline fares that began in 1977 on consumers' and producers' 
surplus. The major finding was that airl ine fare deregulation 
resulted in an increase in consumer surplus of between $15 and 
$20 per round t r ip ,  while leaving airline profits unchanged.
The case of the airline ''deregulation in the United States was 
taken up,because i t  would seem worthwhile to reflect on the 
lessons which could be drawn and the policies which guided such 
deregulation. Also, there existed some similarit ies between 
the U.S.airline industry and the Philippine domestic shipping 
industry in that both industries would be highly competitive, 
volati1e, and complex.
According to Breyer (57), the application of classical price 
and entry regulation would likely produce unnecessary an t i ­
competitive harms. Companies in a competitive industry subject 
to cost-of-service ratemaking would compete by providing con- ‘ 
sumers with more service or quality than they would want. More­
over, regulators would find i t  particularly d iff icult  to apply 
cost-of-service ratemaking to industries with many firms and 
the rationale for price regulation, excessive competition, 
would ordinarily be weak as alternatives to regulation would be 
available.
While air  travel would be cyclical as i t  would be strongly 
affected by changes in disposable personal income, domestic 
shipping in the Philippines would have i t s  "peak" and "lean" 
months.
Air carriers would serve numerous c i t ie s ,  while inter-island 
vessels would call on many ports.
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At one time, there was debate in Canada on whether efficiency 
in transport should be the objective of transport policy, or 
whether transport should be used as an instrument to achieve 
national and regional economic and social goals. The government 
had introduced legislation consistent with the la t te r  view. 
Heaver and Nelson (58) maintained and concluded that to change 
the present policy on the regulation of transport would be a 
grave mistake. Social and economic goals should be pursued 
through direct intervention in the economy. Where transport 
was the most cost-effective instrument, intervention should be 
through the promotional and operational functions, not the 
regulatory function, of the government.
Regarding regulation of ca rrie rs ' charges by the U. S. Interstate 
Commerce Commission, economists found i t  to be harmful in pre­
venting proper use of capacity in back hauls.
Since forward and back hauls must be considered true jo in t pro­
ducts, the ICC's policy of pro-rating truck line-haul costs 
equally to both directions exacerbated the problem of excess 
capacity. If ICC-regulated trucks enjoyed the freedom from rate 
regulation which prevailed in Great Britain and Australia, an 
estimated 2.7 million of the 4.7 million empty back hauls in 
1976 would have been loaded, with a welfare gain of a t least 
$182 million.
Machan and Johnson (59) stated that "despite the ends intended, 
regulation has iicreasingly been shown to be inherently counter­
productive".
Shipping, in general, and international liner shipping, in 
particular, in most member-countries of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), enjoyed total or 
partial de jure exemption from existing restric tiv e  business 
practices legislation. Even in those countries where shipping 
was not specifically exempted, the practical effects were that 
conference behavior.- was. a t least tolerated.
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Governments of all these countries seemed to have accepted 
that the liner conference system was desirable in principle and 
that legislative involvement was only necessary to correct the 
possible abuses within the conference system. Most countries 
enjoyed at their disposal a legal framework which, under certain 
conditions, allowed individuals or designated bodies to investi­
gate conference trades and practices and, where necessary, to 
bring them into court. Nonetheless, apart from the United States, 
the rather limited number of investigations reported which had 
led to court proceedings seemed to suggest that the practical 
exemption from restric tive business practices legislation did 
not create any substantial problems (60).
Since 1983, the government had already deregulated the f i r s t  
class passenger rates. The authorities up to this time had not 
received any complaint either from the passengers or from the 
shipping companies. While there was a slight drop in passenger 
revenue, and for that matter even cargo volume decreased, such 
reductions were attributed to the recession presently prevailing 
in the Philippines.
At this juncture, "certain important differences between working 
under competitive and under regulated environments;would be inevit­
able. In the former, prices would adjust rapidly; investors 
would earn rents when the price of reproducing old equipment would 
increase; they might suffer windfall losses when technology would 
lower reproduction costs; prices would be based on present costs, 
not those of a tes t year; changes in demand resulting from 
change in price would be taken into account as they would occur; 
and firms could experiment with different price structures.
In the la t te r ,  on the other hand, prices would remain stable for 
fixed periods of time; the prices set might not yield the amount 
of revenue that the regulator would expect; and as costs would 
increase or decrease due to added efficiency, prices would not 
change; nor would prices change to reflect possible increases or 
decreases in the cost of supplying similar service; and firms
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would find price experimentation difficult".
"While regulation would not be totally undesirable, the need for 
administrative practicability and the difficulty of economic 
prediction, particularly on demand responses, would make i t  
virtually impossible for the regulator to replicate the price 
and cost results of a hypothetically competitive industry. The 
regulatory process, even when i t  would function perfectly, would 
not be able to reproduce the price signals that a workably com­
petitive market place would provide" (61).
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CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Among the formulas or methods presented in this study and 
considering the conditions obtaining in the Philippine domestic 
shipping scene, two of them appeared to be the best possible 
replacement for the existing method. In the order of immediate 
implementability, these would be the stowage factor based 
freight rate method and free competition or deregulation.
From the foregoing discussions, i t  should be obvious that de­
regulation would have more advantages than the SFBFR method. 
However, the absence of the major elements necessary for the 
proper functioning of the mechanism of consultation and negotia­
tion between the shippers, on the one hand, and the shipowners 
and operators, on the other, would dictate that i ts  implement­
ation would be d ifficu lt a t the present and should logically be 
deferred to a la te r date.
Unlike in the developed maritime countries where shippers' 
associations appeared to be well organized, in the Philippine 
domestic scene the presence of shippers' organizations for 
numerous commodity groups would s t i l l  be sadly lacking. There 
had emerged associations of large manufacturers in the country, 
such as those in the soap and detergent, the lumber, the coco­
nut and copra, the rice and corn, the sugar, the cement, the 
flour, the galvanizers, the s tee l, the automotive, and other 
groups; but s t i l l  the smaller product groups which constitute 
the majority of the shippers had not yet organized.
At the same time, whether small-or big-time shippers, their 
associations should be conversant with the general rate increases 
and the surcharges, the methods and formulas used, and, perhaps 
more importantly, the monitoring and verification as well as the 
analysis of input data.
In like manner, the inter-island shipowners and operators 
should organize themselves more effectively, particularly in 
the area of developing functional freight conferences aside 
from establishing the ir own capability for policing the ir own 
ranks.
Moreover, in the in terest of the public, the undue increase in 
freight rates of essential commodities brought about by 
deregulation should proceed on a graduated scale. Aside from 
gradual deregulation, i t  might also be necessary to formulate 
the process by stages.
With the exception of "free competition", the SFBFR method 
seemed to be the most advantageous of all the other methods 
and formulas mentioned in th is study, most especially the 
existing method, particularly in terms of advantages including 
the simplicity of computations required. Its application, if  
finally  adopted, would however be slightly  delayed due to vital 
requirements, such as the preparation of a table of commodity 
stowage factors based on metric units and on local conditions.
Furthermore, if  the SFBFR method would be adopted, the shippers, 
as a group, and the shipowners and operators, as another group, 
should f i r s t  agree on the stowage factors to be used for the 
various commodities before implementation could finally  take 
place.
For the computation of the general rate increase as well as 
bunker and currency surcharges, the method used by the majority 
of the conferences all over the world, the weighted percentage 
cost change, as presented and discussed in th is study would 
appear to be the simplest and the most logical alternative that 
could be used to replace the existing method.
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